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Federal Wetland Jurisdiction and the Power To Regulate 
Commerce: Searching for the Nexus 
in Gerke Excavating 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Courts reviewing the constitutionality of federal wetland regulation 
have an elephant in the living room. While congressional regulation of 
intrastate wetlands may be indispensable to the preservation of our 
nation’s environmental well-being, the basis for such power is a very 
complicated issue. Courts have upheld such regulations as a valid 
exercise of Congress’s Commerce Clause power1 but have failed to 
conduct a thorough examination of the constitutionality of these 
regulations in light of more recent Commerce Clause decisions.2 The 
Supreme Court has generally declined to confront the issue,3 though it 
may in two cases for which it has granted certiorari in the 2005–2006 
term: Carabell v. United States Army Corps of Engineers4 and United 
States v. Rapanos.5  
In United States v. Gerke Excavating, Inc.,6 Judge Posner of the 
Seventh Circuit wrote a strikingly brief opinion that is exemplary of the 
heuristic reasoning courts use in reviewing the validity of federal wetland 
 1. See John C. Eastman, A Fistful of Denial: The Supreme Court Takes a Pass on 
Commerce Clause Challenges to Environmental Laws, 2004 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 469. 
 2. The three major Commerce Clause cases most recently decided by the Supreme Court are 
Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195 (2005); United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000); and 
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995). 
 3. See United States v. Rapanos, 376 F.3d 629, 635 (6th Cir. 2004) (“Unfortunately, the two 
leading Supreme Court cases on the reach of the CWA have done little to clear the muddied waters 
of CWA jurisdiction.”); Eastman, supra note 1; Raymond Takashi Swenson, Continuing Chaos at 
the Corps: The Turbulent State of Clean Water Act Jurisdiction, 47 ADVOC. 15, 16 (2004). The last 
Supreme Court case to scrutinize federal wetland regulation did not confront the more difficult issue 
of whether the Constitution authorizes federal regulation of intrastate wetlands with some 
hydrological connection to waters that are navigable-in-fact. The case involved the narrower issue of 
the “migratory bird rule,” which was a regulation promulgated by the United States Army Corps of 
Engineers that asserted federal jurisdiction over isolated, intrastate wetlands solely on the basis of 
occasional occupation by migratory birds. See Solid Waste Agency v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 
531 U.S. 159 (2001); see also discussion infra Part II.B.3.  
 4. 391 F.3d 704 (6th Cir. 2004), cert. granted, 126 S. Ct. 415 (2005). 
 5. 376 F.3d 629, cert. granted, 126 S. Ct. 414 (2005). 
 6. 412 F.3d 804 (7th Cir. 2005). 
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regulation. In this case, the Seventh Circuit upheld the constitutionality 
of the Federal Clean Water Act7 as applied to intrastate wetlands with a 
very tenuous connection to any navigable interstate waters.8
This Note argues that in upholding the Clean Water Act, the court in 
Gerke arrived at the correct holding, albeit with an inadequate analysis. 
More specifically, this Note argues that under Gonzales, Morrison, and 
Lopez,9 federal wetland regulation does not cleanly fit into any of the 
Commerce Clause’s three delineated categories of permissible 
regulation—channels of commerce, instrumentalities or things in 
commerce, or activities that substantially affect interstate commerce10—
and, therefore, cannot be upheld solely on the basis of the commerce 
power. Instead, federal wetland regulation can survive modern 
Commerce Clause scrutiny only under an alternative, or “at least more 
nuanced,” conception of the commerce power that incorporates the 
Necessary and Proper Clause. Justice Scalia enunciated such a 
conception of the commerce power in his concurrence to the Court’s 
most recent Commerce Clause decision, Gonzales v. Raich.11
This more nuanced conception of the commerce power recognizes 
that federal regulation of intrastate wetlands is not legitimate with the 
Commerce Clause as its only basis. As previously stated, wetland 
regulation does not fit into the three categories of activities or things that 
Congress may regulate under the Commerce Clause. However, the 
enabling power of the Necessary and Proper Clause allows Congress to 
regulate intrastate wetlands as an essential component of the broader 
federal regulation of interstate waters. Justice Scalia’s conception of the 
interplay between the Necessary and Proper Clause and the Commerce 
Clause suggests that Congress could regulate noneconomic activity that 
substantially affects interstate commerce where that noneconomic 
activity falls within a broader regulatory scheme of economic activity.12 
This Note proposes that, by analogy, the Necessary and Proper Clause 
 7. Federal Water Pollution Control (Clean Water) Act, Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816 
(1972) (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–1387 (2000)). 
 8. See discussion infra Parts III, IV.A. 
 9. Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195, 2205 (2005); United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 
598, 608–09 (2000); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558–59 (1995); see discussion infra Part 
II.A.6. 
 10. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 58–59. 
 11. Gonzales, 125 S. Ct. at 2215 (Scalia, J., concurring); see discussion infra Part IV.B. 
 12. Gonzales, 125 S. Ct. at 2215 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
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empowers Congress to regulate intrastate wetlands as part of its broader 
scheme of regulating interstate waters as channels of commerce. 
Part II of this Note first examines the development of Commerce 
Clause jurisprudence, giving a detailed explanation of where it stands 
today and a brief survey of how it got there. Part II briefly explains what 
wetlands are and the history of their regulation. Part III summarizes the 
facts and the holding of the principal case, United States v. Gerke 
Excavating, Inc. Part IV highlights the analysis missed by the principal 
case and how federal wetland regulation could be legitimately justified 
under Justice Scalia’s conception of the Commerce Clause as it relates to 
the Necessary and Proper Clause. Part V gives a brief conclusion. 
II. BACKGROUND 
A. The Commerce Clause 
This Section will briefly survey the history of the Commerce Clause 
beginning from the first major Supreme Court cases, as this history is an 
integral part of how the Court currently interprets the scope of this 
provision.  
1. The Marshall period 
That the United States government is one of limited and enumerated 
powers is a firmly rooted principle of American constitutional law.13 
Among Congress’s constitutional grants of authority is the power “[t]o 
regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, 
and with the Indian Tribes.”14 The first major exercise of federal 
 13. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8; Morrison, 529 U.S. at 607 (“Every law enacted by Congress 
must be based on one or more of its powers enumerated in the Constitution.”); Lopez, 514 U.S. at 
551 (characterizing the concept of enumerated powers as “first principles” of the Constitution); 
Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 33 (1824) (“[T]he constitution of the United States is one 
of limited and expressly delegated powers, which can only be exercised as granted, or in the cases 
enumerated.”); McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 405 (1819) (“This government is 
acknowledged by all to be one of enumerated powers.”); Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 
137, 176 (1803) (“The powers of the legislature are defined, and limited; and that those limits may 
not be mistaken, or forgotten, the constitution is written.”); Jonathan H. Adler, Judicial Federalism 
and the Future of Federal Environmental Regulation, 90 IOWA L. REV. 377, 389 (2005). 
 14. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3; see also, Gonzalez, 125 S. Ct. at 2205 (“The Commerce 
Clause emerged as the Framers’ response to the central problem giving rise to the Constitution itself: 
the absence of any federal commerce power under the Articles of Confederation.”); GERALD 
GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 93 (12th ed. 1991) (explaining that the commerce power was 
“designed to promote a national market and curb Balkanization of the economy”). 
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commerce power came without controversy in 1787 when Congress 
passed the Interstate Commerce Act.15 After the 1787 Act, nearly thirty 
years passed before the Supreme Court first construed Congress’s 
commerce power16 in Gibbons v. Ogden.17 Chief Justice Marshall’s 
seminal opinion established that this power “is complete in itself, may be 
exercised to its utmost extent, and acknowledges no limitations, other 
than are prescribed in the constitution.”18 Despite this broad 
characterization, Marshall made clear that the power “may very properly 
be restricted to that commerce which concerns more States than one. . . . 
The enumeration presupposes something not enumerated.”19 
Significantly, Gibbons established that the Commerce Clause grants 
Congress the authority to regulate channels of commerce.20
Despite Marshall’s vigorous characterization of federal power to 
regulate channels of commerce, he later refused to strike down a 
Delaware statute that authorized the construction of a dam that 
obstructed a navigable creek.21 Marshall suggested that federal authority 
over navigable waters is not absolute in the sense that a state could 
incidentally regulate commerce so long as the regulation was not 
repugnant to the commerce power.22 Although this opinion focused on 
 15. 24 Stat. 379; see Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 121 (1942). 
 16. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 553; PAUL R. BENSON, JR., THE SUPREME COURT AND THE 
COMMERCE CLAUSE, 1937–1970, at 9 (1970). 
 17. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1. 
 18. Id. at 196. 
 19. Id. at 194–95. Chief Justice Marshall also stated, “It is not intended to say that these 
words comprehend that commerce, which is carried on between man and man in a State, or between 
different parts of the same State, and which does not extend to or affect other States.” Id. at 194. 
 20. Id. at 197 (“The power of Congress, then, comprehends navigation, within the limits of 
every State in the Union; so far as that navigation may be, in any manner, connected with 
‘commerce with foreign nations, or among the several States, or with the Indian tribes.’” (quoting 
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8)). Similarly, the concurring opinion stated, “When speaking of the power of 
Congress over navigation, I do not regard it as a power incidental to that of regulating commerce; I 
consider it as the thing itself; inseparable from it as vital motion is from vital existence.” Id. at 229 
(Johnson, J., concurring). 
 21. Willson v. Black-Bird Creek Marsh Co., 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 245 (1829). The state statute 
was sustained “even though the dam obstructed navigation of the creek by a vessel sailing under a 
federal coasting license identical to that held by Gibbons.” BENSON, supra note 16, at 25. Chief 
Justice Marshall stated, 
It cannot be urged that the power to regulate commerce can interfere with the rights of the 
states over the property within their boundaries. While the waters of the United States 
belong to the whole people of the nation, this creek continued subject to the power of the 
state in whose territory it rises. 
Black-Bird Creek, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) at 249. 
 22. Black-Bird Creek, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) at 251–52. 
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the “dormant” Commerce Clause23 rather than on Congress’s affirmative 
commerce power, it casts some doubt on any interpretation of Gibbons as 
a carte blanche to Congress regarding its regulatory power over channels 
of commerce.  
2. The post-Marshall antebellum period 
Most early Commerce Clause disputes after Gibbons focused not on 
the limits of federal commerce power but rather on the validity of 
“discriminatory state legislation”—legislation that restricts or burdens 
interstate commerce, against the backdrop of this broad national 
power.24 Between 1837 and 1852, under the direction of Chief Justice 
Taney, “[t]he Court . . . fell into what may best be described as a state of 
confusion regarding . . . the commerce power.”25 Following this so-
called “state of confusion” and focus on the nature of the commerce 
power, the Court’s attention turned to the subjects of that power.26 In 
Cooley v. Board of Wardens, the Court established a compromise that 
gave to Congress exclusive authority to regulate commerce as to subjects 
of a national concern and to states the limited authority to regulate local 
matters, even if they had an effect on interstate commerce.27 But during 
 23. Essentially, the “dormant” commerce power is the idea that the Commerce Clause itself 
imposes a restriction on the states’ power to regulate commerce, giving the federal government 
virtually exclusive jurisdiction. Professor Sunstein explains, “The Commerce Clause is both an 
authorization to Congress and, more controversially, a self-executing prohibition on certain state 
actions burdening interstate commerce.” Cass R. Sunstein, Naked Preferences and the Constitution, 
84 COLUM. L. REV. 1689, 1705 (1984). Exactly what the scope of the “dormant” Commerce Clause 
is and what role it should play has been the subject of an ongoing and controversial debate since the 
days of Chief Justice Marshall. See, e.g., Julian N. Eule, Laying the Dormant Commerce Clause To 
Rest, 91 YALE L.J. 425 (1982). 
 24. See Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195, 2205 (2005); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 
549, 553 (1995); Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 121 (1942); Lori J. Warner, The Potential 
Impact of United States v. Lopez on Environmental Regulation, 7 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 321, 
326 (1997); J. Blanding Holman, IV, After United States v. Lopez: Can the Clean Water Act and the 
Endangered Species Act Survive Commerce Clause Attack?, 15 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 139, 142 (1995). 
 25. BENSON, supra note 16, at 26 (referring to cases such as Thurlow v. Commonwealth (The 
License Cases), 46 U.S. (5 How.) 504 (1847), where “the justices were badly divided in their 
reasoning, and six of them wrote nine different opinions”). 
 26. BENSON, supra note 16, at 27. “[W]hen the nature of a power like this is spoken of . . . it 
must be intended to refer to the subjects of that power, and to say they are of such a nature as to 
require exclusive legislation by Congress.” Cooley v. Bd. of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299, 319 
(1851) (emphasis added). 
 27. Cooley, 53 U.S. (12 How.) at 319; see also BENSON, supra note 16, at 35. 
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most of the second half of the nineteenth century, the Court had scant 
occasion to examine the scope of Congress’s commerce power.28  
3. Reconstruction and a dramatic shift 
In the decades leading up to the turn of the century, laissez-faire 
economics had gradually prompted another shift in jurisprudence that 
caused the Court to impose stifling limits on commerce power. To 
achieve this end, the Court often applied formalistic distinctions29 such 
as distinguishing commerce from manufacturing,30 or direct effects from 
indirect effects on interstate commerce.31 Then, in 1937, the Supreme 
Court suddenly withdrew from its activist role in reviewing 
congressional authority.32 This marked the beginning of a long period 
during which the commerce power grew into a powerful legislative force 
with firm approbation from the Court.33
 28. See Matthew L. Pirnot, Note, United States v. Wilson: Did Interstate General 
Substantially Affect Interstate Commerce?, 77 N.C. L. REV. 361, 377 (1998) (“Until the late 
nineteenth century, the Court remained relatively silent with respect to the dimensions of Congress’s 
power under the Commerce Clause, in part because the controversy over slavery prevented 
consensus in exercising the power.”). 
 29. DONALD L. DOERNBERG, SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY OR THE RULE OF LAW: THE NEW 
FEDERALISM’S CHOICE 160–61 (2005); Logan Everett Sawyer, III, Jurisdiction, Jurisprudence, and 
Legal Change: Sociological Jurisprudence and the Road to International Shoe, 10 GEO. MASON L. 
REV. 59, 64 (2001) (“Clear examples of formal jurisprudence are Lochner-era Commerce Clause 
cases.”). The principle behind the decisions of this period has been described as the concept of “dual 
federalism,” whereby the federal government and the states were seen as coequal sovereigns with 
mutually exclusive powers that could not overlap, the Tenth Amendment representing an affirmative 
limit on the power of Congress. BENSON, supra note 16, at 59–60; DOERNBERG, supra at 160. 
 30. See, e.g., Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 301 (1936); Hammer v. Dagenhart, 
247 U.S. 251, 272 (1918) (“Over interstate transportation, or its incidents, the regulatory power of 
Congress is ample, but the production of articles, intended for interstate commerce, is a matter of 
local regulation.”); United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1, 13 (1895). 
 31. A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935); Adair v. United 
States, 208 U.S. 161, 178 (1908) (requiring “some real or substantial relation to or connection” to 
commerce). 
 32. See BENSON, supra note 16, at 73–75. This change is generally thought to have been 
precipitated in part by President Franklin D. Roosevelt who, in anticipating problems with New Deal 
legislation, proposed a “court-packing plan,” whereby he could appoint six new justices to the Court. 
Id.; see also Holman, supra note 24, at 142–43; David W. Scopp, Commerce Clause Challenges to 
the Endangered Species Act: The Rehnquist Court’s Web of Confusion Traps More Than the Fly, 39 
U.S.F. L. REV. 789, 790 (2005). 
 33. See DOERNBERG, supra note 29, at 163; Adler, supra note 13, at 390 (“For most of the 
latter half of the twentieth century, the notion that there were justiciable limits on the scope of 
Congress’s Commerce Clause power was a dead letter.”); Sylvia Law, Families and Federalism, 44 
WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 175, 227 (2000) (“From 1937 until 1995, the Court never struck down an act 
of Congress for exceeding its powers under the Commerce Clause.”); Michael P. Van Alstine, The 
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4. The New Deal 
This expansion of commerce power began with abandonment of the 
formalistic distinctions the Court had previously applied to limit 
congressional commerce power.34 The Court revealed its new policy of 
judicial deference in three major cases: NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel 
Co.,35 United States v. Darby,36 and Wickard v. Filburn.37 Significantly, 
Jones & Laughlin Steel established that Congress has the power to 
regulate intrastate activities that “have such a close and substantial 
relation to interstate commerce that their control is essential or 
appropriate to protect that commerce from burdens and obstructions.”38 
In Jones & Laughlin Steel, the Court “departed from the distinction 
between ‘direct’ and ‘indirect’ effects”39 and held that although a steel 
company’s conduct might only affect interstate labor relations 
“indirect[ly] or remote[ly],” the industry as a whole would certainly have 
a significant enough impact on interstate commerce to bring the conduct 
within the purview of congressional authority.40 This holding formed the 
Costs of Legal Change, 49 UCLA L. REV. 789, 807 n.88 (2002) (“For a prolonged period (from the 
end of the Lochner era until quite recently), the possibility of substantive limits on Congress’s 
Commerce Clause power was viewed as little more than theoretical.”). 
For contemporary views of pre-1995 limitations on the Commerce Clause, see United States 
v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 600 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring) (“When asked at oral argument if there 
were any limits to the Commerce Clause, the Government was at a loss for words.”); GUNTHER, 
supra note 14, at 93 (“After nearly 200 years of government under the Constitution, there are very 
few judicially enforced checks on the commerce power.”); BERNARD SCHWARTZ, CONSTITUTIONAL 
LAW: A TEXTBOOK 122 (2d ed. 1979) (“A question that naturally arises, to one familiar with the 
recent decisions, is that of what constitutional limitations, if any, still remain upon the commerce 
power.”); LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 297 (2d ed. 1988) (“The 
Supreme Court has in recent years largely abandoned any effort to articulate and enforce internal 
limits on congressional power—limits inherent in the grants of power themselves.”); Richard A. 
Epstein, The Proper Scope of the Commerce Power, 73 VA. L. REV. 1387, 1387 (1987) (“[T]oo 
much water has passed over the dam for there to be a candid judicial reexamination of the 
Commerce Clause that looks only to first principles.”). 
 34. See supra notes 29–31 and accompanying text. 
 35. 301 U.S. 1 (1937). 
 36. 312 U.S. 100 (1941). 
 37. 317 U.S. 111 (1941). 
 38. 301 U.S. at 37. 
 39. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 555 (1995) (citing Jones & Laughlin Steel, 301 
U.S. at 36–38). 
 40. Jones & Laughlin Steel, 301 U.S. at 41–43. The Court stated, 
We are asked to shut our eyes to the plainest facts of our national life and to deal with the 
question of direct and indirect effects in an intellectual vacuum. Because there may be 
but indirect and remote effects upon interstate commerce in connection with a host of 
local enterprises throughout the country, it does not follow that other industrial activities 
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basis of what is now known as the “substantial effects” test.41 Though 
Jones & Laughlin Steel opened the floodgates for broad federal 
commerce power, the Court expressed an important caveat that 
Rehnquist-era Supreme Court Justices would later emphasize: 
[T]he scope of this power must be considered in the light of our dual 
system of government and may not be extended so as to embrace 
effects upon interstate commerce so indirect and remote that to 
embrace them . . . would effectually obliterate the distinction between 
what is national and what is local and create a completely centralized 
government.42
Following Jones & Laughlin Steel, the Court in United States v. 
Darby “recognized the power of Congress . . . to declare that an entire 
class of activities affects commerce.”43 This principle would allow 
Congress to regulate local activities as long as they exerted an effect on 
interstate commerce when viewed as a class, and it also formed the basis 
for the expansive rule articulated in Wickard v. Filburn.44
Wickard, decided the same year as Darby, set out a holding that has 
been referred to as the “high water mark” in federal commerce power.45 
This case involved a wheat farmer who argued that certain 
amendments46 to the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 193847 were 
unconstitutional as applied to him because the Act extended federal 
authority to regulate wheat that was grown entirely for the purposes of 
do not have such a close and intimate relation to interstate commerce as to make the 
presence of industrial strife a matter of the most urgent national concern. 
Id. at 41. 
 41. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558–59. Essentially, the “substantial effects” test puts an activity 
within the scope of Commerce Clause regulation if that activity exerts a substantial effect on 
interstate commerce. For further explanation, see infra Part II.A.6.b. 
 42. 301 U.S. at 37, cited in Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195, 2216 (Scalia, J., concurring); 
United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 608 (2000); Lopez, 514 U.S. at 557; id. at 585 (Thomas, J., 
concurring); Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass’n, 452 U.S. 264, 309 (1981). Similar 
to this language in Jones & Laughlin Steel, Justice Cardozo had previously noted that “[t]here is a 
view of causation that would obliterate the distinction between what is national and what is local in 
the activities of commerce.” A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 554 
(1935) (Cardozo, J., concurring). 
 43. Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183, 192 (1968) (citing United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 
100, 120–21 (1941)). 
 44. 317 U.S. 111 (1942). 
 45. DOERNBERG, supra note 29, at 162; see also Lopez, 514 U.S. at 560 (characterizing 
Wickard as “the most far reaching example of Commerce Clause authority over intrastate activity”). 
 46. 55 Stat. 203. 
 47. 52 Stat. 31 (current version at 7 U.S.C. §§ 1281–1521 (2000)). 
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his own consumption.48 In upholding the Act, the Court introduced what 
has been called the “aggregation principle,”49 which allows Congress to 
regulate a class of activities that have little or no effect on interstate 
commerce individually, but which exert a substantial effect on commerce 
in the aggregate.50 After Wickard, the Court allowed Congress to expand 
federal control into areas such as civil rights,51 criminal law,52 and 
environmental law.53
In just 200 years, the scope of the Commerce Clause had evolved 
from Chief Justice Marshall’s healthy ox, to a caged little pet, to a 
monstrous and uncontrollable beast. This set the stage for a surprising 
return to judicial scrutiny of Commerce Clause legislation in United 
States v. Lopez.54 This evolution also set a precarious stage for the 
Court’s wrestle with the principle of dual sovereignty. 
5. Federalism 
Despite the Court’s refusal to impose internal limits on the 
commerce power (in other words, limits inherent within the Commerce 
Clause),55 it eventually found external limits: namely, the Tenth 
Amendment. In National League of Cities v. Usery, decided in 1976,56 
the Court held that “the Tenth Amendment acted as a substantive limit on 
the commerce power.”57 This holding imposed an external restriction on 
 48. Wickard, 317 U.S. at 118. 
 49. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 600 (Thomas, J., concurring); Scopp, supra note 32, at 798. 
 50. Wickard, 317 U.S. at 127–28 (“That appellee’s own contribution to the demand for wheat 
may be trivial by itself is not enough to remove him from the scope of federal regulation where, as 
here, his contribution, taken together with that of many others similarly situated, is far from 
trivial.”); see also Arthur B. Mark, III, Currents in Commerce Clause Scholarship Since Lopez: A 
Survey, 32 CAP. U. L. REV. 671, 679–80 (2004); Pirnot, supra note 28, at 379–80; Warner, supra 
note 24, at 328–29. 
 51. For cases upholding Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 under the commerce power, 
see Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964); Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 
241 (1964). For cases upholding congressional prohibition of discrimination in public transportation 
under the commerce power, see Boynton v. Virginia, 364 U.S. 454 (1960); Henderson v. United 
States, 339 U.S. 816 (1950); Morgan v. Virginia, 328 U.S. 373 (1946); Mitchell v. United States, 
313 U.S. 80 (1941). 
 52. See Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146 (1971). 
 53. See discussion infra Part II.B. 
 54. 514 U.S. 549 (1995); see infra Part II.A.6. 
 55. See TRIBE, supra note 33, at 297. 
 56. 426 U.S. 833 (1976). 
 57. Warner, supra note 24, at 331. In National League of Cities, the Court affirmed that “an 
express declaration of this limitation [on the commerce power] is found in the Tenth Amendment.” 
426 U.S. at 842. 
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congressional commerce power based on the principle of dual 
sovereignty—a principle external to the Commerce Clause itself. The 
Court proved to be somewhat schizophrenic regarding this external limit 
on the commerce power when, in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan 
Transit Authority,58 it overruled National League of Cities not long after 
it was decided. In 1992, the Court returned to enforcing external, state-
sovereignty limits on the commerce power but did not expressly overrule 
Garcia.59 While it is uncertain how much weight federalism still carries 
in the Commerce Clause arena, it certainly has not been forgotten.60
6. 1995–present: Lopez, Morrison, and Gonzales 
a. Facts and background. The Court’s abstinence from enforcing 
internal limits and ambivalence in enforcing external limits created a 
state such that its 1995 decision in United States v. Lopez61 shocked the 
legal community.62 For the first time in more than half a century,63 the 
 58. 469 U.S. 528, 531, 556 (1985) (stating that “the principal and basic limit on the federal 
commerce power is that inherent in all congressional action—the built-in restraints that our system 
provides through state participation in federal governmental action”). National League of Cities, 
itself, overruled Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183 (1968), a relatively recent precedent. See Nat’l 
League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 853–54. 
 59. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 149 (1992). Justice O’Connor based the 
limitation on the “spirit of the Tenth Amendment.” Garcia, 469 U.S. at 585 (O’Connor, J., 
dissenting). In New York, the Court explained this so-called “spirit” of the Tenth Amendment:  
The Tenth Amendment likewise restrains the power of Congress, but this limit is not 
derived from the text of the Tenth Amendment itself, which, as we have discussed, is 
essentially a tautology. Instead, the Tenth Amendment confirms that the power of the 
Federal Government is subject to limits that may, in a given instance, reserve power to 
the States. 
505 U.S. at 156–57 (emphasis added). 
 60. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 568–84 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring) 
(arguing that the Gun-Free School Zones Act should be struck down on considerations of federalism 
rather than on any inherent limits on the commerce power). For a thorough discussion of the ongoing 
debate as to whether the Tenth Amendment is a substantive limit on federal power, or merely a 
truism, see John R. Vile, Truism, Tautology or Vital Principle?: The Tenth Amendment Since United 
States v. Darby, 27 CUMB. L. REV. 445 (1996). 
 61. 514 U.S. 549 (1995). 
 62. See, e.g., Cary B. Davis, The Commerce Clause: Border Crossing + Church Burning = 
Interstate Commerce (A Formula for Federalizing Common Law State Crimes): United States v. 
Ballinger, 57 FLA. L. REV. 975, 976–77 (2005); Eastman, supra note 1, at 471; E. Thomas Sullivan, 
Judicial Sovereignty: The Legacy of the Rehnquist Court, 20 CONST. COMMENT. 171 (2003) 
(reviewing JOHN T. NOONAN, JR., NARROWING THE NATION’S POWER: THE SUPREME COURT SIDES 
WITH THE STATES (2002)); Paul Tzur, Comment, I Know Economic Activity When I See Economic 
Activity: An Operational Overhaul of the Measure by Which Federal Criminal Conduct Is Deemed 
“Economic,” 94 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1105, 1105–06 (2004). 
 63. See Holman, supra note 24, at 139; Warner, supra note 24, at 323. 
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Court declared that Congress had exceeded its power to legislate under 
the Commerce Clause by enacting the Gun-Free School Zones Act.64 
Some commentators questioned the shelf-life of Lopez,65 but, five years 
later in United States v. Morrison,66 the Court again declared that a 
statute overreached Congress’s commerce power and affirmed its 
willingness to enforce limits on that power. However, a more recent 
decision, Gonzales v. Raich,67 casts doubt on the viability of the Lopez 
and Morrison decisions, leaving this area of law in a state of 
uncertainty.68
At issue in Lopez was section 922(q) of the Gun-Free School Zones 
Act of 1990,69 which subjected to federal criminal prosecution “any 
individual [who] knowingly . . . possess[ed] a firearm at a place that the 
individual knows, or has reasonable cause to believe, is a school zone.”70 
The Court found that the Act exceeded Congress’s authority to regulate 
commerce because it was “a criminal statute that by its terms [had] 
nothing to do with ‘commerce’ or any sort of economic enterprise.”71  
In Morrison, the challenged legislation was a provision of the 
Violence Against Women Act of 1994, which gave victims of gender-
motivated violence a civil remedy in federal court.72 The Court found 
the statute beyond the purview of the Commerce Clause because “[t]he 
 64. Pub. L. No. 101-647, 104 Stat. 4844 (1990) (formerly codified at 18 U.S.C. § 921–22).  
 65. See, e.g., DAVID L. SHAPIRO, FEDERALISM: A DIALOGUE 141 (1995) (“[T]he impact of 
the [Lopez] decision on broader questions of federal power will be limited.”); Deborah Jones Merritt, 
The Fuzzy Logic of Federalism, 46 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 685, 693 (1996) (“As a practical matter, 
Lopez has deprived Congress of very little power.”). 
 66. 529 U.S. 598 (2000); see also Lilly Santaniello, Commerce Clause Challenges to the 
Endangered Species Act’s Regulation of Intrastate Species on Private Land, 10 HASTINGS W.-NW. J. 
ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 39, 43 (2003). 
 67. 125 S. Ct. 2195 (2005). 
 68. See Craig M. Bradley, What Ever Happened to Federalism?, 41 TRIAL 52 (2005) (“[T]he 
Court strangled in its infancy the so-called federalism revolution that began a mere 10 years ago.”); 
Pamela A. MacLean, In Focus: Circuit Court Review: Circuits Split on Wetlands Control, NAT’L 
L.J., Aug. 15, 2005, at S1. Doubts cast by Gonzales are accentuated by the fact that it was a six-to-
three decision, whereas Lopez and Morrison were more sharply divided five-to-four decisions. A 
fact that further weakens the precedent value of Lopez and Morrison is that two of the three justices 
in favor of declaring the Controlled Substances Act (in Gonzales) as beyond the purview of the 
commerce power, will no longer be on the Court when future Commerce Clause cases are decided.  
 69. 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(1)(A) (1994), invalidated by United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 
(1995), amended by Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009, 3009-369 to 3009-370 (1996). 
 70. 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(1)(A) (1994). 
 71. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561. 
 72. 42 U.S.C. § 13981 (1994), invalidated by United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 
(2000). 
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regulation and punishment of intrastate violence that is not directed at the 
instrumentalities, channels, or goods involved in interstate commerce has 
always been the province of the States.”73  
Finally, in Gonzales v. Raich, the Court addressed a challenge to the 
Controlled Substances Act, which imposed federal criminal penalties on 
anyone caught in the unauthorized manufacturing, dispensing, 
distributing, or possessing of a controlled substance.74 Contrary to what 
may have been expected after Lopez and Morrison, the Court rejected the 
constitutional challenges to the Act.75 The Court stated that “case law 
firmly establishes Congress’s power to regulate purely local activities 
that are part of an economic ‘class of activities’ that have a substantial 
effect on interstate commerce.”76
While these three cases present a doctrine that can be difficult to 
apply consistently,77 the doctrine itself can be summarized with some 
clarity. As a preliminary matter, in each of the three cases the Court 
explained that the activities subject to congressional regulation under the 
Commerce Clause fall into three categories: (1) channels of interstate 
commerce; (2) instrumentalities, persons, or things in interstate 
commerce; and (3) activities that substantially affect or have a substantial 
relation to interstate commerce.78 Facts and circumstances before the 
Court in each case afforded it an opportunity to examine only the third 
and most controversial category: the “substantial effects test.”79
b. The substantial effects test. The Court emphasized four factors to 
examine in determining whether an activity could be regulated under this 
third category.80 First, the Court emphasized that for an activity to 
 73. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 618. 
 74. 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 844(a) (2000). 
 75. Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195, 2215 (2005). 
 76. Id. at 2205. 
 77. Christy H. Dral & Jerry J. Phillips, Commerce by Another Name: The Impact of United 
States v. Lopez and United States v. Morrison, 68 TENN. L. REV. 605, 616 (2001). 
 78. Gonzales, 125 S. Ct. at 2205; Morrison, 529 U.S. at 608–09; United States v. Lopez, 514 
U.S. 549, 558–59 (1995). 
 79. Gonzales, 125 S. Ct. at 2205; Morrison, 529 U.S. at 609; Lopez, 514 U.S. at 559. 
 80. Gonzales, 125 S. Ct. at 2205–15; Morrison, 529 U.S. at 609–16; Lopez, 514 U.S. at 559–
68. Regarding the “substantial effects” test, Justice Scalia’s concurring opinion in Gonzalez noted 
that “the power . . . cannot come from the Commerce Clause alone. . . . Congress’s regulatory 
authority over intrastate activities that are not themselves part of interstate commerce (including 
activities that have a substantial effect on interstate commerce) derives from the Necessary and 
Proper Clause.” Gonzales, 125 S. Ct. at 2216 (Scalia, J., concurring) (citations omitted); see also id. 
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“substantially affect” interstate commerce, the activity should be 
economic in nature.81 The Court made a broad declaration that “[w]here 
economic activity substantially affects interstate commerce, legislation 
regulating that activity will be sustained.”82 In an attempt to refine this 
test, the Gonzales majority defined “economic” as “the production, 
distribution, and consumption of commodities.”83 Applying the 
aggregation principle articulated in Wickard,84 the Gonzales majority 
stated that in the case of inherently economic activity, the Court “need 
not determine whether [the] activities, taken in the aggregate, 
substantially affect interstate commerce in fact, but only whether a 
‘rational basis’ exists for so concluding.”85 However, while the fact that 
at 2221 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (citing her prior dissenting opinion in Garcia v. San Antonio 
Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 585–86 (1985)); id. at 2230–31 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
In Gonzales, the majority began its opinion by stating that “[t]he question presented in this 
case is whether the [Necessary and Proper Clause] includes the power to prohibit the local 
cultivation and use of marijuana in compliance with California law,” but did not explicitly address 
the matter further. Id. at 2198–99. Justice Scalia argued that this fact rendered the majority’s 
“substantial effects” category “incomplete because the authority to enact laws necessary and proper 
for the regulation of interstate commerce is not limited to laws governing intrastate activities that 
substantially affect interstate commerce.” Id. at 2216 (Scalia, J., concurring). Justice O’Connor did 
not explicitly discuss how this affected her analysis, and Justice Thomas suggested a resurrection of 
Chief Justice Marshall’s view of what is necessary and proper: “Let the end be legitimate, let it be 
within the scope of the constitution, and all means which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted 
to that end, which are not prohibited, but consist with the letter and spirit of the constitution, are 
constitutional.” Id. at 2230–31 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 
Wheat) 316, 421 (1819)). The implications of the Necessary and Proper Clause on the commerce 
power are discussed in detail in Part IV.B. 
 81. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 559–61 (holding that because the Gun Free School Zones Act 
regulated noneconomic activity, it could not be subject to Wickard’s aggregation principle); see also 
Gonzales, 125 S. Ct. at 2205–06, 2211 (upholding the Controlled Substances Act because “[l]ike the 
farmer in Wickard, respondents [were] cultivating, for home consumption, a fungible commodity for 
which there is an established, albeit illegal, interstate market . . . the activities regulated by the CSA 
are quintessentially economic”); Morrison, 529 U.S. at 610–11, 613 (striking the civil remedy 
provision of the Violence Against Women Act because “[g]ender-motivated crimes of violence are 
not, in any sense of the phrase, economic activity”). 
 82. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 560; see also Gonzales, 125 S. Ct. at 2210; id. at 2216 (Scalia, J., 
concurring); Morrison, 529 U.S. at 610.  
 83. Gonzales, 125 S. Ct. at 2211 (quoting WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL 
DICTIONARY 720 (1966)). Justice O’Connor described the majority’s explanation as a “breathtaking” 
definition that “threatens to sweep all of productive human activity into federal regulatory reach.” Id. 
at 2224 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
 84. See supra notes 44–50 and accompanying text. 
 85. Gonzales, 125 S. Ct. at 2208 (citations omitted). It bears emphasis that in determining 
whether an activity substantially affects interstate commerce, the aggregation principle is only 
applicable to economic activities. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 560–61; Jonathan H. Adler, Wetlands, 
Waterfowl, and the Menace of Mr. Wilson: Commerce Clause Jurisprudence and the Limits of 
Federal Wetland Regulation, 29 ENVTL. L. 1, 35 (1999). 
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an activity is economic is sufficient under the test, it apparently is not 
necessary that it be an economic activity if the effect of the activity is 
economic in nature: “[E]ven if [the] activity be local and though it may 
not be regarded as commerce, it may still, whatever its nature, be reached 
by Congress if it exerts a substantial economic effect on interstate 
commerce.”86  
A point mentioned by the Gonzales majority, and heavily 
emphasized by Justice Scalia in his concurring opinion, is that an activity 
need not be economic in nature if it is “merely one of many ‘essential 
part[s] of a larger regulation of economic activity, in which the 
regulatory scheme could be undercut unless the intrastate activity were 
regulated.’”87 This means that regulation of a noneconomic activity can 
be sustained under the substantial effects test if it is a necessary 
component in a larger scheme of economic regulation.88  
To summarize, in order for federal legislation to pass muster as a 
valid exercise of the commerce power under the substantial effects test, it 
must regulate an activity that: (1) is economic in nature, (2) has a 
significant economic impact on interstate commerce, or (3) is regulated 
as an “essential” component of an overall scheme of economic regulation 
that is itself valid. 
In determining whether the legislation is valid, the Court considers 
three other factors. First, the Court looks for a “jurisdictional element 
which would ensure, through case-by-case inquiry, that the [activity] in 
question affects interstate commerce.”89 Essentially, this is a technical 
aspect of legislation that limits the triggering of federal jurisdiction to 
circumstances that involve interstate commerce. For example, 
committing federal securities fraud requires the use of a “manipulative or 
deceptive device” that is employed using “any means or instrumentality 
of interstate commerce or of the [U.S.] mails, or of any facility of any 
national securities exchange.”90 The presence of a jurisdictional element 
 86. Gonzales, 125 S. Ct. at 2205–06 (quoting Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 125 (1942)). 
 87. Id. at 2210, 2211 (quoting Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561); id. at 2217–20 (Scalia, J., 
concurring). 
 88. An illustration of this principle can be found in Gonzales, where Justice Scalia stated that 
“the subdivided class of activities defined by the Court of Appeals was an essential part of the larger 
regulatory scheme. . . . Congress could reasonably conclude that its objective of prohibiting 
marijuana from the interstate market ‘could be undercut’ if those activities were excepted from its 
general scheme of regulation.” Id. at 2210, 2220 (Scalia, J., concurring) (quoting Lopez, 514 U.S. at 
561). 
 89. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561–62; see also Morrison, 529 U.S. at 613. 
 90. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 10, 15 U.S.C. § 78(j) (2000) (emphasis added). 
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is not dispositive under the substantial effects test but is, rather, one 
factor to consider. This factor weighed into the invalidation of the 
legislation in Lopez and Morrison,91 but the Gonzales majority did not 
mention it. 
The third factor addressed by the Court is whether the regulation in 
question is supported by legislative findings of fact “regarding [the] 
effect [of the regulated activity] on interstate commerce.”92 The Court 
looks for direct evidence in the legislative history that the activity being 
regulated actually affects interstate commerce. As with the jurisdictional 
element, findings of fact are part of the analysis, but not necessary for the 
Court to uphold legislation.93
Finally, the Court considers whether the activity’s connection to 
commerce is so tenuous that the Court “would have to pile inference 
upon inference in a manner that would bid fair to convert congressional 
authority under the Commerce Clause to a general police power of the 
sort retained by the states.”94 This factor examines the length and 
integrity of the causal chain between the regulated activity and the 
purported effects on interstate commerce. A weak connection weighs 
against the validity of the legislation. 
To summarize, for legislation to be a valid exercise of the commerce 
power under the substantial effects test, it must have some connection to 
economic activity. If the economic connection can be established, other 
factors a court may consider include whether the legislation has a 
jurisdictional element, the existence and contents of congressional 
findings of fact, and the significance of the connection between the 
regulated activity and interstate commerce. While Lopez, Morrison, and 
 91. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 613; Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561–63. 
 92. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 562; see also Morrison, 529 U.S. at 612, 614. 
 93. Gonzales, 125 S. Ct. at 2208 (“While congressional findings are certainly helpful . . . 
particularly when the connection to commerce is not self-evident . . . the absence of particularized 
findings does not call into question Congress’ authority to legislate.”); Lopez, 514 U.S. at 1631–32. 
In Morrison, the Court invalidated the statute at issue despite voluminous findings indicating that the 
regulated activity actually had a significant effect on interstate commerce, stating that “the existence 
of congressional findings is not sufficient, by itself, to sustain the constitutionality of Commerce 
Clause legislation.” 529 U.S. at 614. 
 94. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567. The example of attenuated reasoning cited by the Court was that 
“(1) gun-related violence is a serious problem; (2) that problem, in turn, has an adverse effect on 
classroom learning; and (3) that adverse effect on classroom learning, in turn, represents a 
substantial threat to trade and commerce.” Id. at 565 (citing id. at 623 (Breyer, J., dissenting)); see 
also Morrison, 529 U.S. at 615–16 (“The reasoning that petitioners advance seeks to follow the but-
for causal chain from the initial occurrence of violent crime . . . to every attenuated effect upon 
interstate commerce.”). 
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Gonzales have articulated a fairly straightforward doctrine, the cases 
have not left a predictable guide for application of the doctrine.95 
Despite the difficulty in applying this doctrine, this Note concludes that 
the substantial effects test, at least without the support of the Necessary 
and Proper Clause, cannot sustain Congress’s assertion of federal 
wetland jurisdiction.96 This conclusion incorporates this principle as 
analogized from Justice Scalia’s concurring opinion in Gonzales. 
c. Justice Scalia’s concurrence in Gonzales. While Justice Scalia 
agreed with the Court’s holding in Gonzales, he had a slightly different, 
or “at least more nuanced,” conception of why the holding was right.97 
In addition to the power “[t]o regulate Commerce,”98 the Constitution 
vests Congress with the power “[t]o make all Laws which shall be 
necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, 
and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the 
United States or in any Department or Officer thereof.”99 This power is 
found in the Necessary and Proper Clause. 
Justice Scalia found the legislation at issue to be within Congress’s 
power by virtue of the interplay between the commerce power and the 
necessary and proper power.100 He stated that the Necessary and Proper 
Clause allows Congress to regulate, with its commerce power, intrastate 
noneconomic activities that are “an essential part of a larger regulation of 
economic activity, in which the regulatory scheme could be undercut 
unless the intrastate activit[ies] were regulated.”101 Justice Scalia 
 95. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 627 (Thomas, J., concurring) (describing the test as a “rootless 
and malleable standard”); Alex Kreit, Comment, The Future of Medical Marijuana: Should the 
States Grow Their Own?, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1787, 1825 (2003) (“[T]he current ‘substantial effects’ 
doctrine makes a clear analysis difficult.”). 
 96. See discussion infra Part IV. 
 97. Gonzales, 125 S. Ct. at 2215 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 98. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
 99. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 18. 
 100. In Lopez, Justice Thomas also recognized the synergy created by the interplay of the two 
clauses, but characterized the utility of this interplay as being very limited. United States v. Lopez, 
514 U.S. 549, 588 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring) (“After all, if Congress may regulate all matters 
that substantially affect commerce, there is no need for the Constitution to specify that Congress may 
enact bankruptcy laws, cl. 4, or coin money and fix the standard of weights and measures, cl. 5, or 
punish counterfeiters of United States coin and securities, cl. 6.”). 
 101. Gonzales, 125 S. Ct. at 2217 (Scalia, J., concurring) (quoting Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561). 
The Gonzales majority articulated a similar principle but did not explicitly tie it to the Necessary and 
Proper Clause. See id. at 2205–15. This principle was also recognized by the Fourth Circuit in 
United States v. Deaton, though the court did not explicitly invoke the Necessary and Proper Clause 
to achieve its result. 332 F.3d 698, 707 (4th Cir. 2003) (“The power over navigable waters also 
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explained that this principle “referred to those cases permitting the 
regulation of intrastate activities ‘which in a substantial way interfere 
with or obstruct the exercise of the granted power.’”102 For example, in 
Gonzales Justice Scalia agreed with the majority that Congress could 
prohibit intrastate marijuana possession. However, Justice Scalia argued 
that congressional power to regulate intrastate marijuana possession 
arose not by virtue of the commerce power alone, but because the 
regulation was essential to the success of the overall federal scheme 
regulating controlled substances.103 Justice Scalia further explained that 
for a court reviewing this kind of legislation, “[t]he relevant question is 
simply whether the means chosen are ‘reasonably adapted’ to the 
attainment of a legitimate end under the commerce power.”104 This Note 
will explain how federal wetland regulation can be properly sustained 
under this application of the Necessary and Proper Clause to the 
Commerce Clause.105
B. Federal Wetlands Regulation 
Before discussing the Commerce Clause as applied to federal 
wetland regulations, this Section will explain what wetlands are, briefly 
summarize the legislation that has affected wetlands, and discuss the 
current legislation that makes wetland regulation controversial. 
1. The meaning of “wetland” 
Wetlands elicit very different images from different people. Some 
see wetlands as sacred ground, as places of hallowed sanctuary. Henry 
David Thoreau, the “patron saint of swamps,”106 wrote, “If there were 
Druids whose temples were the oak groves, my temple is the swamp.”107 
carries with it the authority to regulate nonnavigable waters when that regulation is necessary to 
achieve Congressional goals in protecting navigable waters.”). 
 102. Gonzales, 125 S. Ct. at 2217 (Scalia, J., concurring) (quoting United States v. 
Wrightwood Dairy Co., 315 U.S. 110, 119 (1942)). 
 103. Id. at 2219 (“That simple possession is a noneconomic activity is immaterial to whether it 
can be prohibited as a necessary part of a larger regulation.”). 
 104. Id. at 2217 (citing United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 121 (1941)). 
 105. See discussion infra Part IV. 
 106. RODNEY JAMES GIBLETT, POSTMODERN WETLANDS: CULTURE, HISTORY, ECOLOGY 229 
(1996). 
 107. William L. Howarth, Imagined Territory: The Writing of Wetlands, 30 NEW LITERARY 
HIST. 509, 527 (1999). For some entertaining and romantic views on wetlands, see GIBLETT, supra 
note 106; BARBARA HURD, STIRRING THE MUD: ON SWAMPS, BOGS, AND HUMAN IMAGINATION 
(2001). 
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Others may see wetlands as “places of darkness, disease and death, 
horror and the uncanny, melancholy and the monstrous,”108 nothing 
more than “a hideaway for scoundrels, debtors, enchanted women . . . 
runaway slaves, and hermits.”109 This apprehensive view of wetlands is 
dramatically reflected in Chief Justice Marshall’s statement about a 
creek: “It is one of those sluggish reptile streams, that do not run but 
creep, and which, wherever it passes, spreads its venom, and destroys the 
health of all those who inhabit its marshes.”110 Personal views aside, 
wetlands are a vital component of our natural environment and 
ecosystems.111
So just what is a wetland? It has been said that “[a] wetland is 
whatever a competent expert says it is,”112 and that “the definition of 
wetlands [is] more a matter of politics than science,”113 which, for the 
purposes of this Note, it is. The agency charged with enforcing wetland 
regulations, the Army Corps of Engineers (“the Corps”), has defined 
wetlands as follows: 
The term wetlands means those areas that are inundated or saturated by 
surface or ground water at a frequency and duration sufficient to 
support, and that under normal circumstances do support, a prevalence 
of vegetation typically adapted for life in saturated soil conditions. 
Wetlands generally include swamps, marshes, bogs, and similar 
areas.114
 108. GIBLETT, supra note 106, at xi. 
 109. HURD, supra note 107, at 46. 
 110. Willson v. Black-Bird Creek Marsh Co., 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 245, 249 (1829). 
 111. Wetlands serve many functions: some wetlands store flood waters, some help to control 
erosion, and they all generally provide a unique habitat for certain plants and animals. Further, some 
recharge underground aquifers, some help remove pollutants from water, and they also provide 
many different types of recreation. See United States v. Byrd, 609 F.2d 1204, 1210–11 (7th Cir. 
1979); 42 Fed. Reg. 37,128 (July 19, 1977); COMMITTEE ON MITIGATING WETLAND LOSSES ET AL., 
COMPENSATING FOR WETLAND LOSSES UNDER THE CLEAN WATER ACT 27–34 (2001); PAUL D. 
CYLINDER, ET AL., WETLANDS REGULATION 2 (1995); S.M. HASLAM, UNDERSTANDING WETLANDS: 
FEN, BOG AND MARSH 22–41 (2003); JON KUSLER & TERESA OPHEIM, OUR NATIONAL WETLAND 
HERITAGE: A PROTECTION GUIDE 1–10 (2d ed. 1996); WILLIAM M. LEWIS, JR., WETLANDS 
EXPLAINED: WETLAND SCIENCE, POLICY, AND POLITICS IN AMERICA 41–64 (2001); Lee Evan 
Caplin, Is Congress Protecting Our Water? The Controversy over Section 404, Federal Water 
Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, 31 U. MIAMI L. REV. 445, 455–56 (1977); Holman, 
supra note 24, at 205–06; Stephen M. Johnson, United States v. Lopez: A Misstep, but Hardly 
Epochal for Federal Environmental Regulation, 5 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 33, 71–73 (1996). 
 112. HASLAM, supra note 111, at 1. 
 113. LEWIS, supra note 111, at 26. 
 114. 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(8)(b) (2005). 
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2. Federal wetland legislation, historically 
Although humans have devised a number of ingenious ways to abuse 
and destroy the environment, the primary damage to wetlands has come 
directly from draining, filling, and converting wetlands to dry land115—
euphemistically referred to as “reclamation.”116 Early American 
colonists quickly began draining wetlands with “small hand-dug 
ditches,” and this progressed during the country’s period of Westward 
expansion.117 In 1850 Congress passed the Swamp Land Act,118 which 
allowed the states to “reclaim the swamp and overflowed lands 
therein.”119 The federal government’s anti-wetland policy reached its 
high-water mark in the early 20th century when it, “in essence, provided 
free engineering services to farmers to drain wetlands” and “shared the 
cost of drainage projects.”120 But eventually, the growing body of 
information on wetlands prompted a change in policy. The shift began in 
1934 when Congress passed the Migratory Bird Hunting Stamp Act,121 
which imposed a cost on hunting waterfowl and allocated some of the 
proceeds for acquiring wetlands to be set aside as “Waterfowl Production 
Areas.”122
Before the colonists’ “reclamation” began, wetlands comprised about 
225 million acres of United States territory.123 Researchers currently 
estimate that total wetland acreage has been reduced by about fifty 
 115. J. Gardiner, Pressures on Wetlands, in WETLAND MANAGEMENT 47, 50–53 (R.A. 
Falconer & P. Goodwin eds., 1994). 
 116. See P.B. Williams, From Reclamation to Restoration—Changing Perspectives in Wetland 
Management, in WETLAND MANAGEMENT, supra note 115, at 1–3 (“It is perhaps in pursuit of an 
overriding rationalization that the advocates of resource exploitation succeeded in popularizing their 
activities as ‘reclaiming’ rather than ‘claiming,’ implying that all wetlands were formerly dry lands 
and that mankind was merely correcting nature’s mistake.”). 
 117. THOMAS E. DAHL & GREGORY J. ALLORD, NATIONAL WATER SUMMARY ON WETLAND 
RESOURCES, U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, HISTORY OF WETLANDS IN THE CONTERMINOUS UNITED 
STATES, http://water.usgs.gov/nwsum/WSP2425/history.html (last visited Feb. 1, 2006). 
 118. Id. The first Swamp Land Act was passed in 1849 and only applied to Louisiana. In 1850, 
the Swamp Land Act was made applicable to twelve other states. Id. 
 119. Act of Sept. 28, 1850, ch. 84, 9 Stat. 519. 
 120. DAHL & ALLORD, supra note 117.  
 121. Migratory Bird Hunting Stamp (Duck Stamp) Act, ch. 71, 48 Stat. 452 (1934) (codified at 
16 U.S.C. §§ 718a–718j (2000)). 
 122. 16 U.S.C. § 718d(c). 
 123. KUSLER & OPHEIM, supra note 111, at 1; NATURAL RES. CONSERVATION SERV., U.S. 
DEP’T OF AGRIC., RCA ISSUE BRIEF #4, WETLANDS VALUES AND TRENDS (Nov. 1995), 
http://www.nrcs.usda.gov/technical/land/pubs/ib4text.html#losses.  
6LEE.FIN.DOC 5/12/2006 12:32:52 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [2006 
282 
 
percent.124 The enormous loss of wetlands eventually prompted further 
reaction from the federal government to regulate in this area.125 In 1972 
Congress enacted the landmark Clean Water Act (“CWA”), which had 
the stated purpose to “restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and 
biological integrity of the Nation’s waters.”126 Congress enacted this 
legislation pursuant to its power under the Commerce Clause.127 This 
Act was a reflection of the public’s growing concern for wetlands. 
Wetlands eventually gained a very high priority on political agendas. The 
Bush (Sr.) and Clinton Administrations adopted and endorsed a national 
policy known as “no net loss,”128 which refers to the idea that “wetlands 
lost in one location can be replaced by wetlands created at another 
location.”129 Federal environmental protection generally has grown over 
the years such that currently it “arguably represents the most expansive 
assertion of federal authority.”130
3. The controversy 
Wetland regulations, specifically section 404 of the CWA,131 have 
created a controversy as to how far the federal government can extend its 
authority over non-navigable waters through the Commerce Clause. 
Commerce Clause jurisdiction over waters that are navigable-in-fact is 
 124. COMMITTEE ON MITIGATING WETLAND LOSSES, ET AL., supra note 107, at 1; WETLANDS 
VALUES AND TRENDS, supra note 123; see also United States v. Gerke Excavating, Inc., 412 F.3d 
804, 806 (7th Cir. 2005) (“There are believed to be more than 100 million acres of wetlands in the 
lower 48 states.” (citation omitted)). 
 125. See KUSLER & OPHEIM, supra note 111, at 1–4. Notably, the federal government was not 
actively involved in any kind environmental protection before the late 1960s when it began enacting 
a number of environmental statutes. See Adler, supra note 13, at 381–82 (“[M]ost environmental 
concerns were addressed at the state and local level, if they were addressed at all.”). The latter half 
of the twentieth century witnessed a complete turnaround in United States environmental policy; 
“[b]etween the 1850s and 1970s, the federal government was intent on eliminating wetlands. Since 
then, it has been equally intent on preserving them.” LEWIS, supra note 111, at 3–4. 
 126. Federal Water Pollution Control (Clean Water) Act, Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816 
(1972) (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–1387 (2000)). 
 127. See Adler, supra note 13, at 404 (“[W]hen the various environmental statutes were 
adopted, the underlying assumption was that the Commerce Clause ‘grants virtually carte blanche 
authority to Congress to legislate for environmental protection.’” (quoting Denis Binder, The 
Spending Clause as a Positive Source of Environmental Protection: A Primer, 4 CHAP. L. REV. 147, 
148 (2001))). 
 128. See KUSLER & OPHEIM, supra note 111, at 3–4. 
 129. LEWIS, supra note 111, at 16. For a sharp criticism of the inadequacy of the “no net loss” 
policy, see id. at 16–17. 
 130. See Adler, supra note 13, at 387. 
 131. CWA § 404, 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (2000). 
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uncontroversial and was established nearly two-hundred years ago.132 
Section 404 of the CWA, which “prohibits the discharge of dredge or fill 
materials into ‘navigable waters’ without a permit,”133 has raised the 
controversy as to how far federal jurisdiction extends to waters that are 
not navigable-in-fact. 
“Navigable waters,” as used in the statute, is a term of art. What, 
exactly, constitutes these “navigable waters” over which Congress and 
the Army Corps of Engineers (“the Corps”)134 claims jurisdiction is the 
center of the CWA’s controversy. The CWA cryptically defines 
“navigable waters” as “waters of the United States, including the 
territorial seas.”135 Pursuant to administrative authority, the Corps 
enacted regulations defining “waters of the United States” to include 
“[w]etlands adjacent to” other waters listed in the section.136 It further 
defines “adjacent” as “bordering, contiguous, or neighboring.”137 
Federal jurisdiction over directly adjacent wetlands was upheld by a 
unanimous Supreme Court in United States v. Riverside Bayview 
Homes,138 but this was a decade before the Court’s return to a critical 
review of federal commerce power. 
The Corps also enacted what became known as the “migratory bird 
rule,” which extended federal jurisdiction into intrastate waters that could 
“be used as habitat by birds protected by Migratory Bird Treaties . . . [or] 
by other migratory birds which cross state lines.”139 The “migratory bird 
rule” effectively authorized federal regulation over non-navigable 
intrastate wetlands, including man-made ponds that certain birds 
happened to land in occasionally.140
By the time the Court reviewed the “migratory bird rule” in Solid 
Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. United States Army Corps of 
 132. See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 197 (1824); Matthew B. Baumgartner, 
Note, SWANCC’s Clear Statement: A Delimitation of Congress’s Commerce Clause Authority To 
Regulate Water Pollution, 103 MICH. L. REV. 2137, 2141 (2005). 
 133. Holman, supra note 24, at 165. 
 134. The Army Corps of Engineers is the federal agency charged with enforcing section 404 
of the CWA. CWA § 404, 33 U.S.C. § 1344; see also Johnson, supra note 111, at 68. 
 135. CWA § 502(7), 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7). 
 136. 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a)(1)–(7) (2005). 
 137. Id. § 328.3(c). 
 138. 474 U.S. 121, 139 (1985). 
 139. 51 Fed. Reg. 41,206, 41,217 (Nov. 13, 1986) (formerly codified at 33 C.F.R. § 
328.3(a)(3) (1999)).  
 140. See id. 
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Engineers (“SWANCC ”),141 Congress’s commerce power had been cast 
in a new light under the Lopez and Morrison decisions. In fact, the 
SWANCC opinion, like the Lopez and Morrison opinions, was delivered 
by Chief Justice Rehnquist with an identical five-to-four division.142 In 
SWANCC, the Court held that the “migratory bird rule” was not 
authorized by the CWA, suggesting that the provision went beyond the 
power granted by the Commerce Clause.143 Although decided on a 
statutory basis, the SWANCC holding can be characterized as a 
constitutional ruling because, as explained by Judge Posner, 
The arguments are interchangeable, since the only reason . . . to doubt 
the validity of the regulation is the principle that the meaning of a 
statute or a regulation can be stretched where that is necessary to avoid 
its being held unconstitutional. The idea here would be that the Corps 
of Engineers would prefer a bobtailed regulation to none if that is the 
choice forced on it by the Constitution.144
The SWANCC Court suggested that in order for federal jurisdiction 
to exist over wetlands, there should be a “significant nexus between the 
wetlands and ‘navigable waters.’”145 But because the Court did not draw 
a very bright line, it fostered a division among the lower courts as to 
where that line should be drawn on the continuum that ranges from 
wetlands directly adjacent to navigable waters, to wetlands with a much 
more distant or tenuous physical connection to navigable waters.146 
Most jurisdictions have given SWANCC a narrow reading that restricts 
 141. 531 U.S. 159 (2001). 
 142. In all three cases, Chief Justice Rehnquist was joined by Justices Scalia, Kennedy, 
O’Connor, and Thomas while Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg and Breyer wrote or joined in 
dissenting opinions. Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195, 2195 (2005); United States v. Morrison, 
529 U.S. 598, 598 (2000); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 549 (1995). 
 143. SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 174 (“We thus read the [CWA] as [not authorizing the ‘migratory 
bird rule’] to avoid the significant constitutional and federalism questions raised by [the Corps’] 
interpretation.”). 
 144. United States v. Gerke Excavating, Inc., 412 F.3d 804, 806 (7th Cir. 2005); see also 
SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 173 (“[W]here an otherwise acceptable construction of a statute would raise 
serious constitutional problems, the Court will construe the statute to avoid such problems unless 
such construction is plainly contrary to the intent of Congress.”). 
 145. SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 167; see also Carabell v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 391 F.3d 
704, 710 (6th Cir. 2004), cert. granted, 126 S. Ct. 415 (2005); In re Needham, 354 F.3d 340, 347 
(5th Cir. 2003). 
 146. See United States v. Adam Bros. Farming, Inc., 369 F. Supp. 2d 1180, 1183–84 (C.D. 
Cal. 2004); Adler, supra note 13, at 419; Maclean, supra note 68, at S1. 
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only federal regulation over isolated intrastate wetlands.147 However, 
some courts, including the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, have 
interpreted the SWANCC opinion more broadly.148
 To summarize the state of the law at the time Gerke Excavating was 
decided, there are two main points. First, Commerce Clause 
jurisprudence had evolved to a point where regulation had to fall within 
at least one of three categories in order to be constitutionally valid: (1) 
channels of commerce; (2) instrumentalities, persons or things in 
commerce; or (3) activities that substantially affect commerce. Second, 
the extent of federal jurisdiction over wetlands had been called into 
question after the Lopez decision. The Court’s SWANCC opinion 
resolved the issue of the “migratory bird rule,” but left one very 
important question unanswered—specifically, just how substantial of a 
connection between regulated wetlands and interstate navigable waters is 
required for the federal government to sustain that regulation under the 
commerce power. 
III. UNITED STATES V. GERKE EXCAVATING, INC. 
Following prior Seventh Circuit interpretation,149 the Gerke court 
permitted the federal government to assert jurisdiction over wetlands 
with a very tenuous connection to any navigable waters—wetlands 
“drained by a ditch that runs into a nonnavigable creek that runs into [a] 
nonnavigable . . . [r]iver, which in turn runs into [a navigable river].”150 
Gerke Excavating had “dumped dredged stumps, and roots, plus sand-
 147. See, e.g., Gerke, 412 F.3d 804; Carabell, 391 F.3d 704; United States v. Rapanos, 376 
F.3d 629 (6th Cir. 2004), cert. granted, 126 S. Ct. 414 (2005); United States v. Reuth Dev. Co., 335 
F.3d 598 (7th Cir. 2003); United States v. Deaton, 332 F.3d 698 (4th Cir. 2003); Headwaters, Inc. v. 
Talent Irrigation Dist., 243 F.3d 526 (9th Cir. 2001). 
 148. See In re Needham, 354 F.3d 340, 345–46 (5th Cir. 2003) (“The CWA and the OPA are 
not so broad as to permit the federal government to impose regulations over ‘tributaries’ that are 
neither themselves navigable nor truly adjacent to navigable waters.”); Rice v. Harken Exploration 
Co., 250 F.3d 264 (5th Cir. 2001); FD&P Enters. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 239 F. Supp. 2d 
509, 516 (D.N.J. 2003) (“[A] ‘significant nexus’ must constitute more than a mere ‘hydrological 
connection.’”); United States v. RGM Corp., 222 F. Supp. 2d 780 (E.D. Va. 2002). For a more 
thorough discussion of the varying interpretations of the CWA, see Marjorie A. Shields, Annotation, 
What Are “Navigable Waters” Subject to Federal Water Pollution Control Act (33 U.S.C.A. §§ 1251 
et seq.), 160 A.L.R. FED. 585 (2000). 
 149. Reuth Dev. Co., 335 F.3d 598. In Reuth, the Seventh Circuit upheld federal jurisdiction 
over wetlands “adjacent to an unnamed tributary to Dyer Ditch, which flows north to Hart Ditch, 
which flows north to the Little Calumet River, which is a navigable water of the United States.” Id. 
at 600. 
 150. Gerke, 412 F.3d at 805. 
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based fill” into wetland portions of a 5.8 acre tract. Because Gerke did 
not first obtain a permit from the Corps, its actions violated the CWA.151 
Gerke argued that the Corps’ assertion of jurisdiction over the wetlands 
in question “exceed[ed] the authority granted the Corps of Engineers by 
the Clean Water Act,” or, in the alterative, that “if the regulation [was] 
within the congressional grant of authority, then it exceed[ed] the 
authority that the Commerce Clause . . . grants Congress.”152 The case 
was analyzed in light of its inherent constitutional argument because, as 
explained before, the statutory and constitutional arguments “are 
interchangeable.”153
The court began its analysis with a brief discussion of the language 
of the regulation in question. As explained above,154 the Corps enacted 
regulations extending federal jurisdiction over “wetlands adjacent to” 
any other waters covered in the regulation.155 The court acknowledged 
the difficulty of applying the term “adjacent” to wetlands connected to a 
navigable river through a series of tributaries,156 but went no further 
because Gerke did “not argue that the regulation is inapplicable to this 
case.”157 The court indirectly analyzed the meaning of “adjacent” in the 
remainder of its opinion but did not focus on how the meaning of the 
word fit into the constitutional analysis. 
The court next discussed the “navigable waters doctrine,”158 which 
permits Congress to regulate “waterways used to transport people and 
goods in interstate or foreign commerce”159 and was established nearly 
two-hundred years ago in Gibbons v. Ogden.160 It pointed out that 
wetlands “supply some of the water in navigable waterways,” and 
 151. Id. 
 152. Id. at 806. 
 153. See supra note 144 and accompanying text. 
 154. See supra notes 136–138 and accompanying text. 
 155. 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a)(7) (2005). 
 156. Gerke, 412 F.3d at 805. The court explained as follows: 
The Lemonweir River is thus a tributary of a navigable river, but are the wetlands 
“adjacent” to the Lemonweir? They are connected to it in the sense that water from the 
wetlands flows into the river, but they might be thought “adjacent” not to the river but 
merely to the ditch, and a ditch is not what one would ordinarily understand as a 
“tributary.” The Wisconsin River, because it flows into the Mississippi, is connected to 
the Gulf of Mexico, but it would be odd to describe it as “adjacent” to the gulf. 
Id. 
 157. Id. 
 158. See Baumgartner, supra note 132, at 2145–49. 
 159. Gerke, 412 F.3d at 806. 
 160. See supra notes 17–20 and accompanying text. 
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although “filling in a 5.8 acre tract . . . is not going to have a measurable 
effect . . . Congress must be able to regulate an entire class of acts if the 
class affects commerce, even if no individual act has a perceptible 
effect.”161 The court never explicitly stated which of the three categories 
of permissible regulation this fell into, but appeared to be applying the 
substantial effects test because the primary cases it cited for its above 
proposition were cases applying the substantial effects test.162 Gerke did 
cite two cases “with specific reference to the regulation of navigable 
waters,” one of which was explicitly applying a channels of commerce 
analysis.163 However, the court gave these two cases no special 
emphasis and appeared to be citing them merely for their support of the 
idea that Congress can regulate “an entire class of acts if the class affects 
commerce.”164
The court stated that part of this power to regulate an entire class of 
activities includes the authority to “forbid the pollution of navigable 
waters even if the pollution has no effect on navigability.”165 Further 
drawing on this principle, the court  quickly concluded that Congress can 
regulate wetlands “if water from the wetlands enters a stream that flows 
into the navigable waterway,” and it matters not “[w]hether the wetlands 
are 100 miles from a navigable waterway or 6 feet.”166 The court’s 
conclusion included a very brief reply to the argument that so much of 
the United States is wetlands, and allowing federal jurisdiction would 
lead to frequent encroachment upon state power and necessarily violate 
principles of federalism. The court responded by stating that the 
argument “is two-edged” because the more wetlands that exist, the more 
impact they will have on interstate navigable waters.167
To summarize, the court began with the proposition that Congress 
can regulate channels of commerce, including navigable waters. The 
court then cited the principle drawn from the substantial effects test, 
which is that even when an activity taken alone is outside the reach of the 
commerce power, the federal government can regulate that activity if it 
 161. Gerke, 412 F.3d at 806 (citing, inter alia, Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195, 2205–07 
(2005); Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 118–29 (1942); United States v. Hicks, 106 F.3d 187, 
188–90 (7th Cir. 1997); United States v. Leslie, 103 F.3d 1093, 1100 (2d Cir. 1997)). 
 162. Id. 
 163. Id. at 806–07 (citing, inter alia, United States v. Deaton, 332 F.3d 698, 706–07 (4th Cir. 
2003); Oklahoma ex rel. Phillips v. Guy F. Atkinson Co., 313 U.S. 508, 525–26 (1941)). 
 164. Id. at 806. 
 165. Id. at 807 (“In fact navigability is a red herring from the standpoint of constitutionality.”). 
 166. Id. 
 167. Id. 
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falls within a larger class of activities that falls within the commerce 
power. The court connected these two principles and held that the Corps 
could assert jurisdiction over wetlands as part of its overall regulation of 
navigable interstate waters, but the court did not explain exactly how or 
why these two principles could work together. Part IV will explain in 
more detail why this analysis was inadequate. 
IV. ANALYSIS 
Although the Gerke court arrived at the correct holding, it did so 
using an abbreviated application of the substantial effects test as applied 
to channels of commerce. This Part first explains why the court’s 
reasoning is difficult to reconcile with the Supreme Court’s Commerce 
Clause jurisprudence. It then shows how the Necessary and Proper 
Clause can augment the reach of the Commerce Clause—as gleaned 
from Justice Scalia’s concurring opinion in Gonzales—to properly 
include wetlands such as those in Gerke. 
A. The Gerke Opinion 
This Section argues that the analysis in Gerke was inadequate for 
two main reasons. First, the opinion does not address the fact that the 
plain language of the CWA and the Commerce Clause does not support 
federal jurisdiction over wetlands with only a tenuous connection to 
waters that are navigable-in-fact. Second, the opinion incorrectly applies 
the substantial effects test to the facts at bar, failing to consider the 
elements of the test as articulated by the Supreme Court.168
1. The plain language of the CWA and the Commerce Clause  
In illustrating why the Commerce Clause alone could not support 
federal jurisdiction over the wetlands in Gerke, this Note’s analysis 
begins with an examination of why the plain language of the CWA and 
the Commerce Clause do not support such jurisdiction. The United States 
Constitution gives Congress the power “[t]o regulate Commerce.”169 
One modern definition of “Commerce” is “[t]he exchange of goods, 
productions, or property of any kind; especially, exchange on a large 
 168. See discussion supra Part II.A.6.b. 
 169. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (emphasis added). 
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scale, as between states or nations; extended trade.”170 Justice Thomas 
summarized what the Framers’ definition might have been as “selling, 
buying, and bartering, as well as transporting for these purposes.”171
The common thread running between these definitions is that 
“commerce” involves transactions or some sort of activity directly 
related to those transactions. Arguably, it is a stretch, albeit a small one, 
to extend this power to actual channels of commerce such as rivers and 
roads. Case law has firmly extended commerce jurisdiction over 
channels of commerce,172 but the language of the Constitution must be 
stretched appreciably to expand that jurisdiction to include tributaries of 
those channels. The plain language of the Commerce Clause must be 
stretched even further in applying the commerce power to “wetlands 
[that] are drained by a ditch that runs into a nonnavigable creek that runs 
into [a] nonnavigable . . . [r]iver, which in turn runs into [a navigable 
river].”173 Filling wetlands without a permit—which the CWA forbids—
is not inherently economic, and its relation to actual channels of 
commerce is no more direct than its connection to economic activity. 
Because the CWA applies to “[w]etlands adjacent to [navigable 
waters],”174 the specific inquiry becomes: How far can one stretch the 
meaning of “adjacent,” and “commerce” along with it? The Fifth Circuit 
articulated a narrow conception of “adjacent,” stating that “both the 
regulatory and plain meaning of ‘adjacent’ mandate a significant 
measure of proximity. Therefore, including all ‘tributaries’ as ‘navigable 
waters’ would . . . extend the OPA175 beyond the limits set forth in 
 170. FUNK & WAGNALLS NEW STANDARD DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 536 
(1963). 
 171. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 585 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring); see also 
Calvin H. Johnson, The Panda’s Thumb: The Modest and Mercantilist Original Meaning of the 
Commerce Clause, 13 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1, 6 (2004) (eschewing dictionary documents in 
favor of “samples” taken from early usage: “In the constitutional debates, ‘regulation of commerce’ 
was most importantly a cover of words for the program of nationalizing the state ‘imposts’ or taxes 
on imports.”). 
 172. Gerke, 412 F.3d at 807; SWANCC, 531 U.S. 159, 181 (2001) (Stevens, J., dissenting) 
(“By 1972, Congress’ Commerce Clause power over ‘navigation’ had long since been established.” 
(citing The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557 (1870); Gilman v. Philadelphia, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 
713 (1865); Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat) 1 (1824))). 
 173. Gerke, 412 F.3d at 806. 
 174. 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a)(1)–(7) (2005). 
 175. OPA is the Oil Pollution Act and, for purposes of federal jurisdiction, is “co-extensive 
with the definition found in the Clean Water Act.” In re Needham, 354 F.3d 340, 344 (5th Cir. 
2003). 
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SWANCC.”176 The Gerke conception of “adjacent” includes, essentially, 
wetlands that drain into tributaries of tributaries of navigable waters.177 
This interpretation requires a significant stretch of the meanings of both 
“commerce” and “adjacent.” Not only does it run contrary to the plain 
language of the CWA and the Commerce Clause, but it also fails to 
address the Supreme Court’s suggestion in SWANCC that a “‘significant 
nexus’ between the wetlands and ‘navigable waters’” exist before the 
Corps can assert jurisdiction over those wetlands.178 The opinion glosses 
over the weakness of the connection between the wetlands filled in 
Gerke and the navigable-in-fact waters to which those wetlands are 
connected, selectively citing precedent from other circuits that supports 
the conclusion.179
2. Substantial effects test incorrectly applied to the CWA 
The next major flaw in the Seventh Circuit’s analysis is the poorly 
supported180 and ambiguous181 application of the substantial effects test 
to the CWA.182 In SWANCC, the Court stated that nothing in “the 
legislative history [of the CWA] . . . signifies that Congress intended to 
exert anything more than its commerce power over navigation.”183 In 
other words, Congress was using its authority here to regulate channels 
of commerce, not to regulate activities that substantially affect 
 176. Id. at 347 n.12. See supra note 145 and accompanying text. 
 177. Gerke, 412 F.3d at 805. Other circuits have adopted this broad view of “adjacent.” See 
United States v. Rapanos, 339 F.3d 447, 450–53 (6th Cir. 2003), cert. granted, 126 S. Ct. 414 
(2005); United States v. Deaton, 332 F.3d 698, 704–12 (4th Cir. 2003). 
 178. See supra note 145 and accompanying text. 
 179. Gerke, 412 F.3d at 807 (citing Rapanos, 339 F.3d at 450–53; Deaton, 332 F.3d at 704–
12). 
 180. See SWANCC, 531 U.S. 159, 173 (2001) (declining to analyze the “migratory bird rule” 
under the substantial effects test); Baumgartner, supra note 132, at 2145 (“SWANCC’s narrow 
construction of the CWA, and its term ‘navigable waters,’ necessarily precludes federal jurisdiction 
on the basis of a substantial effect on commerce.”); see also infra note 185 and accompanying text. 
 181. The application of the substantial effects test in Gerke is not explicit but is manifest in the 
court’s statement that “[t]he sum of many small interferences with commerce can be large, and so to 
protect commerce Congress must be able to regulate an entire class of acts if the class affects 
commerce, even if no individual act has a perceptible effect.” Gerke, 412 F.3d at 806 (citations 
omitted). In addition, the two Supreme Court cases to which the Seventh Circuit cites support the 
above proposition, Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195 (2005), and Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 
(1942), are cases that focus on the substantial effects test and have nothing to do with channels of 
commerce or navigable water. 
 182. See supra notes 161–163 and accompanying text. 
 183. SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 168 n.3 (emphasis added). 
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commerce. SWANCC further explained that the CWA’s reference to 
navigable waters 
was of “limited import” . . . . [However, t]he term “navigable” has at 
least the import of showing us what Congress had in mind as its 
authority for enacting the CWA: its traditional jurisdiction over waters 
that were or had been navigable in fact or which could reasonably be so 
made.184
The fact that the CWA claims jurisdiction over navigable waters 
suggests that the CWA’s Commerce Clause jurisdiction is tied to 
channels of commerce, rather than to activities that substantially affect 
commerce.185 This interpretation makes sense particularly in light of the 
substantial effects doctrine articulated in Lopez, Morrison, and 
Gonzales.186
3. Elements of the substantial effects test not properly considered 
Even assuming that the substantial effects test can be correctly 
applied to channels of commerce, the Seventh Circuit’s application is 
flawed because it does not adequately address considerations that the 
Supreme Court has incorporated into the test. First, the very authority 
that the court cites (at the Supreme Court level) describes Congress’s 
power not as the authority to regulate any activity that substantially 
affects interstate commerce, but as the authority to regulate economic 
activities that have a substantial effect on interstate commerce.187  
Beyond the court’s failure to even consider this factor, it is difficult 
to argue that filling wetlands is “economic activity.”188 Granted, filling 
 184. Id. at 172. 
 185. See United States v. Deaton, 332 F.3d 698, 709 (4th Cir. 2003) (“SWANCC, of course, 
emphasized that the CWA is based on Congress’s power over navigable waters.”). 
 186. See discussion supra Part II.A.6.b. 
 187. See Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195, 2211 (2005) (holding that Congress can prohibit 
intrastate marijuana cultivation under the CSA because “[u]nlike those at issue in Lopez and 
Morrison, the activities regulated by the CSA are quintessentially economic”); Wickard v. Filburn, 
317 U.S. 111, 118–29 (1942); see also United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 560 (1995) (“Even 
Wickard, which is perhaps the most far reaching example of Commerce Clause authority over 
intrastate activity, involved economic activity in a way that the possession of a gun in a school zone 
does not.” (emphasis added)). 
 188. See Deaton, 332 F.3d at 706 (upholding the CWA as applied to wetlands because, in part, 
“Congress’s power over the channels of interstate commerce, unlike its power to regulate activities 
with a substantial relation to interstate commerce, reaches beyond the regulation of activities that are 
purely economic in nature”); Adler, supra note 10, at 35 (“The filling of intrastate, isolated wetlands 
. . . is not inherently economic or commercial in nature.”). But see SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 193 
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wetlands may be in preparation of economic activity such as operating a 
commercial structure to be built on the land that is being filled. 
Alternatively, filling wetlands may be considered economic in that a 
landowner pays an excavating company to do the filling. But the activity 
itself is not inherently economic. 
Importantly, however, the same analogies that would justify 
classifying wetland “reclamation” as economic would have sufficed for 
gun possession in Lopez.189 Guns are articles of commerce that can be 
bought and sold. Yet the Supreme Court found that the statute 
prohibiting the possession of guns in a school zone “by its terms has 
nothing to do with ‘commerce’ or any sort of economic enterprise, 
however broadly one might define those terms.”190 In other words, 
possessing guns, like filling wetlands, is an activity that is not inherently 
economic. 
Second, the court fails to take into account or even acknowledge the 
fact that the Corps’ regulation of “adjacent” wetlands lacks a 
jurisdictional element191 that “might limit its reach to a discrete set of 
[waters] that additionally have an explicit connection with or effect on 
interstate commerce.”192 In fact, the Corps’ regulation extending 
jurisdiction to “adjacent” wetlands broadens federal reach outside of its 
clear jurisdiction over navigable interstate waters. Although the Supreme 
Court did not address the jurisdictional element in its most recent 
commerce analysis in Gonzales, “such a jurisdictional element would 
lend support to the argument that [the regulation] is sufficiently tied to 
interstate commerce.”193  
Third, the court does not inquire into congressional or administrative 
findings of fact detailing the effects of filling “wetlands [that] are drained 
by a ditch that runs into a nonnavigable creek that runs into [a] 
nonnavigable . . . [r]iver, which in turn runs into [a navigable river].”194 
(“[T]he discharge of fill material into the Nation’s waters is almost always undertaken for economic 
reasons.”). 
 189. 514 U.S. at 549. 
 190. Id. at 561. 
 191. See supra notes 89–91 and accompanying text. 
 192. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 611–12 (2000) (quoting Lopez, 514 U.S. at 
562). The basic provisions of the Corps’ interpretation of “navigable waters” include very explicit 
jurisdictional elements. See 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a)(1)–(3) (2005). However, the restrictive language in 
those provisions is significantly broadened by provisions that expand jurisdiction to tributaries and 
adjacent wetlands. Id. § 328.3(a)(5), (7). 
 193. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 598. 
 194. United States v. Gerke Excavating, Inc., 412 F.3d 804, 806 (7th Cir. 2005). 
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Not only is there no explanation of the absence of any factual findings, 
but there is also no discussion of possible ways in which Congress could 
have even rationally concluded195 that such filling affects interstate 
commerce. In other words, the Seventh Circuit did not even apply the 
minimum standard of scrutiny as to this element. 
Finally, even assuming that filling wetlands constitutes “economic” 
activity that can be regulated so long as it exerts a substantial effect on 
interstate commerce, the Seventh Circuit did not articulate what that 
substantial effect is. Again, even under a “rational basis” standard of 
review, a court should articulate what Congress might have rationally 
believed the substantial effects could be.196 Moreover, in describing 
what effects an activity has on interstate commerce, the types of effects 
listed have generally been, for lack of a better term, economic effects.197 
Gerke characterizes the effects of wetland filling as “pollution of 
navigable waters.”198 At first glance, this makes some sense because one 
can imagine, for example, Congress having the power to prohibit 
individuals from dumping toxic chemicals into wetlands, where the 
chemicals would inevitably find their way into rivers that exist as major 
channels of interstate commerce or that contribute to the water supply of 
multiple states. 
What the argument misses, however, is that the CWA defines the 
term “pollutants” so as to include materials such as rock, sand, and tree 
stumps that are merely used as fill,199 and that were exactly the type of 
“pollutants” at issue in Gerke.200 Again, the opinion does not explicitly 
explain what effect, economic or not, these materials have on interstate 
commerce. Rather, it simply concluded,  
 
[I]t doesn’t matter whether . . . the effect may be to reduce water 
levels in navigable waterways . . . or that the effect may be to 
increase the level of pollution in such waters by reducing the 
 195. See supra note 85 and accompanying text. 
 196. See, e.g., Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195, 2211–15 (2005). 
 197. See id. at 2215 (“Congress could have rationally concluded that the aggregate impact on 
the national market of all the transactions exempted from federal supervision is unquestionably 
substantial.” (emphasis added)); Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 126–29 (1942) (“Congress may 
properly have considered that wheat consumed on the farm where grown if wholly outside the 
scheme of regulation would have a substantial effect in defeating and obstructing its purpose to 
stimulate trade therein at increased prices.” (emphasis added)). 
 198. Gerke, 412 F.3d at 807. 
 199. 33 U.S.C. 1362(6) (2005). 
 200. Gerke, 412 F.3d at 805. 
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supply of unpolluted wetlands water. . . . [T]he wetlands are 
“waters of the United States” within the meaning of the Act.201
 
Even if the “pollution” in Gerke actually affected interstate 
commerce, the nexus between the activity in question and interstate 
commerce was very thin. The defendant in Gerke filled wetlands that 
drain into a tributary—of a tributary—of a navigable river. To sustain 
federal regulation based on the Commerce Clause alone, a court “would 
have to pile inference upon inference in a manner that would bid fair to 
convert congressional authority under the Commerce Clause to a general 
police power of the sort retained by the States”202 and subscribe to the 
“view of causation that would obliterate the distinction between what is 
national and what is local in the activities of commerce.”203 In other 
words, permitting federal commerce jurisdiction on the basis of a remote 
chain of causation would allow the Commerce Clause to swallow the 
rule that federal power is limited and enumerated. The Supreme Court 
has explicitly rejected the view “that Congress may regulate 
noneconomic activity based solely on the effect that it may have on 
interstate commerce through a remote chain of inferences.”204 This is 
perhaps the strongest reason why the substantial effects test cannot 
support federal wetland jurisdiction. 
4. Gerke improperly addresses the dual sovereignty argument 
The Seventh Circuit also sidestepped the federalism argument that 
“wetlands of the United States are so extensive that the Corps’ 
interpretation will tilt the balance between federal and state power too 
far.”205 This argument would apply a fortiori to the Gerke court’s 
conception, stemming from its definition of “adjacent,” because “all 
water is connected in some way.”206 The court concludes its opinion 
declaring that “‘adjacent’ can just mean ‘connected.’”207
 201. Id. at 807 (citations omitted). 
 202. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 567 (1995). 
 203. Id. at 567 (quoting A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 554 
(1935) (Cardozo, J., concurring)). 
 204. Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195, 2217 (2005) (Scalia, J., concurring); see also United 
States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 617–18; Lopez, 514 U.S. at 564–66. 
 205. Gerke, 412 F.3d at 807. 
 206. Gartner Lee, Water Sector (2003), http://www.gartnerlee.com/sectors/ 
index.cfm?fuseaction=Sectorinformation&SectorID=35&mainSector=6. 
 207. Gerke, 412 F.3d at 808. 
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In analyzing the federalism issue, the Lopez court emphasized the 
fact that criminal law is a traditional state function.208 Similarly, the 
SWANCC court recognized that “[r]egulation of land use [is] a function 
traditionally performed by local governments.”209 In Gerke, the 
defendant argued that wetlands “are so extensive” that federal regulation 
would impose upon state sovereignty.210 The Seventh Circuit addressed 
the point with the brief explanation that “[t]he argument . . . is two-
edged. The more extensive the wetlands, the greater their potential 
importance as a source of water to keep the navigable waterways full and 
clean.”211 The court’s statement, however, misses the point. Federalism 
is not a question of how substantially an activity is connected to 
interstate commerce, but of “whether an Act of Congress invades the 
province of state sovereignty reserved by the Tenth Amendment.”212  
Nevertheless, federal wetland regulation does not pose the same 
powerful implications of federalism concerns that have been deemed 
important enough to impose limits on that regulation,213 especially in 
light of the more recent federalism analyses in the “anti-commandeering” 
cases.214 Gerke did not come to the wrong conclusion regarding 
federalism, but it failed to adequately support its conclusion. As the next 
Section will explain, federal regulation of wetlands is a legitimate 
exercise of the commerce power as an essential part of a larger 
scheme.215 Therefore, whatever role federalism still plays in Commerce 
Clause jurisprudence, it will not be likely to impose external limitations 
on federal environmental legislation that can overcome the inherent 
limits of enumerated powers. 
 208. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561. 
 209. SWANCC, 531 U.S. 159, 174 (2001) (quoting Hess v. Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp., 
513 U.S. 30, 44 (1994)). 
 210. Gerke, 412 F.3d at 807. 
 211. Id. 
 212. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 155 (1992). 
 213. See Baumgartner, supra note 132, at 2150, 2156–57 (“The channels-of-commerce power 
is plenary and is given great deference by the Court because it does not raise the important 
federalism concerns that regulation of an intrastate activity affecting commerce does.”). 
 214. The two cases generally referred to as “anti-commandeering” cases are New York v. 
United States, 505 U.S. at 174 (striking provisions of the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act 
because Congress cannot force states to “take title to and possession of low level radioactive 
waste”), and Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997) (declaring as unconstitutional portions of 
the Brady Act that imposed obligations on state law enforcement agencies). See Edward Rubin, The 
Myth of Accountability and the Anti-Administrative Impulse, 103 MICH. L. REV. 2073, 2084 (2005). 
 215. See infra Part IV.B.3. 
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5. Touching upon the correct rationale 
Without giving any explicit reasons, the Seventh Circuit stated that 
“Congress must be able to regulate an entire class of acts if the class 
affects commerce, even if no individual act has a perceptible effect.”216 
As Section B will explain, this idea is right on target. It may be that the 
court was proposing precisely the same analysis as this Note. However, 
the bare statement of this proposition does not cure the defects of the 
opinion because the court neither explains the significance nor the source 
of this principle. Had the court adequately laid a foundation and applied 
this principle, the opinion could have been a model for other courts to 
uphold federal wetland regulations. 
B. A Tenable Basis for Federal Wetland Regulation 
This Section will explain the rationale upon which federal wetland 
regulation can be properly upheld. The idea begins with Justice Scalia’s 
proposition that the Necessary and Proper Clause allows Congress, under 
the substantial effects test, to regulate noneconomic intrastate activities 
that fall within a “larger regulation of economic activity.”217 This 
Section explains that, by analogy, Congress can regulate noneconomic 
intrastate activity when that regulation is an essential part of a larger 
regulation of channels of commerce. In Gerke, the court’s upholding of 
federal jurisdiction over wetlands could not have been adequately 
supported by the Commerce Clause alone.218 This Note now considers 
how the holding in Gerke could have been properly supported. 
1. Justice Scalia’s conception applied to wetland regulation 
The interplay between the Commerce Clause and the Necessary and 
Proper Clause, at least as interpreted by Justice Scalia, provides a way to 
put federal wetland regulation on a firm constitutional foundation. As 
explained in Part II, Justice Scalia’s concurring opinion in Gonzales 
focused on the relationship between the Commerce Clause and the 
Necessary and Proper Clause: “[U]nlike the channels, instrumentalities, 
and agents of commerce, activities that substantially affect commerce are 
not themselves part of interstate commerce, and thus the power to 
 216. Gerke, 412 F.3d at 806 (citing, inter alia, Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195, 2205–07 
(2005); Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 118–29 (1942)). 
 217. Gonzales, 125 S. Ct. at 2217 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 218. See supra Part IV.A. 
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regulate them cannot come from the Commerce Clause alone,” but must 
also draw upon the Necessary and Proper Clause.219 This allows 
Congress to regulate noneconomic intrastate activities as long as they are 
indispensable to a larger scheme of interstate economic regulation. By 
analogy, if Congress can regulate noneconomic activities that are 
essential to a larger regulatory scheme by virtue of the Necessary and 
Proper Clause, then it should be able to regulate nonnavigable waters that 
are essential to the larger regulatory scheme involving navigable 
waters.220 
Wetlands and noneconomic activities are both, when taken in 
isolation, outside even Chief Justice Marshall’s broad commerce 
umbrella. Despite the fact that the Commerce Clause “comprehends 
navigation,”221 many wetlands are simply not navigable. Similarly, 
noneconomic activity does not, by its very definition, involve the types 
of transactions that constitute “commerce.” However, the particular 
regulation of certain noneconomic activities may be an indispensable 
part of an interstate regulatory scheme that would be “undercut” in the 
absence of such particular regulation.222
For example, the prohibition of intrastate possession of marijuana, 
whether or not of economic nature in itself, is a necessary part of “a 
comprehensive framework for regulating the production, distribution . . . 
and consumption of commodities for which there is an established, and 
lucrative, interstate market.”223 A lucrative interstate market is a class of 
economic activity that Congress clearly has the power to regulate.224 In 
such a case, the Necessary and Proper Clause permits Congress to 
regulate particular intrastate activities falling within that larger class 
because “the constitution must allow to the national legislature that 
discretion, with respect to the means by which the powers it confers are 
to be carried into execution, which will enable that body to perform the 
 219. Gonzales, 125 S. Ct.  at 2215–16 (Scalia, J., concurring) (internal citation omitted). The 
dissent also recognizes the significant role played by the Necessary and Proper Clause: “This power 
[to regulate activities that substantially affect interstate commerce] derives from the conjunction of 
the Commerce Clause and the Necessary and Proper Clause.” Id. at 2221 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
 220. See United States v. Ashland Oil & Transp. Co., 504 F.2d 1317, 1325, 1327 (6th Cir. 
1974) (invoking the Necessary and Proper Clause in support of its upholding the CWA). 
 221. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 197 (1824). 
 222. Gonzales, 125 S. Ct. at 2217 (Scalia, J., concurring); United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 
598, 657 (2000) (Breyer, J., dissenting); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 561 (1995). 
 223. Gonzales, 125 S. Ct. at 2219 (Scalia, J., concurring); see also id. at 2205–15 (majority 
opinion). 
 224. Id. at 2211. 
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high duties assigned to it, in the manner most beneficial to the 
people.”225 In other words, the Necessary and Proper Clause gives 
Congress authority in addition to its enumerated powers when that 
authority is necessary to carry out those enumerated powers and duties. 
The Necessary and Proper Clause allows a court to go beyond the 
question of whether a particular activity falls within the commerce power 
and to pursue the broader inquiry of whether the particular activity falls 
within a class of activities that substantially affect interstate 
commerce.226
As with the regulation of intrastate marijuana possession as a 
necessary component of national controlled substance regulation, the 
regulation of intrastate wetlands is a necessary part of the overall scheme 
of interstate water regulation. The relevant inquiry begins by asking: 
What is the overall scheme? The preamble to the CWA states that “[t]he 
objective of this [Act] is to restore and maintain the chemical, physical, 
and biological integrity of the Nation’s waters.”227 The question then 
becomes whether this is a “legitimate end”228 that can be supported by 
the Necessary and Proper Clause and whether the regulation in question 
is essential to that scheme. 
The importance of federal environmental regulation has certainly 
been recognized and is, by almost any standard, a legitimate end.229 
Around the time the CWA was enacted, the Sixth Circuit Court of 
Appeals observed, 
Obviously water pollution is a health threat to the water supply of the 
nation. It endangers our agriculture by rendering water unfit for 
irrigation. It can end the public use and enjoyment of our magnificent 
rivers and lakes for fishing, for boating, and for swimming. These 
health and welfare concerns are, of course, proper subjects for 
 225. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421 (1819). 
 226. See Gonzales, 125 S. Ct. at 2215; id. at 2217 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“Although this 
power . . . commonly overlaps with the authority to regulate economic activities that substantially 
affect interstate commerce, and may in some cases have been confused with that authority, the two 
are distinct.”); Lopez, 514 U.S. at 600 (Thomas, J., concurring) (criticizing, but acknowledging that 
the Court “ask[s] whether the class of activities as a whole substantially affects interstate commerce, 
not whether any specific activity within the class has such effects when considered in isolation”). 
 227. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (2000). 
 228. See McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 421. 
 229. See, e.g., SWANCC, 531 U.S. 159, 174–80 (2001) (Stevens, J., dissenting); United States 
v. Ashland Oil & Transp. Co., 504 F.2d 1317 (6th Cir. 1974). But see Adler, supra note 188, at 62–
67 (questioning the efficacy of the CWA); Adler, supra note 13, at 464–65 (advocating the 
decentralization of environmental regulation). 
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Congressional attention because of their many impacts upon interstate 
commerce generally.230
This shows that even in 1974, the nation’s water was recognized as an 
issue of national concern. More recently, one commentator has pointed 
out that the issue of interstate water pollution “poses the identical 
problem that gave rise to the need for an exclusive federal power over 
interstate commerce in the first place,” which is the situation where 
individual state regulation is insufficient, and collective action is 
necessary.231 In addition, the validity of federal regulation of actual 
channels of commerce has been established by almost two centuries of 
case law.232 More specifically, the validity of the CWA as a whole has 
been recognized by the Supreme Court for more than three decades.233
With the legitimacy of the overall scheme established, the final 
inquiry becomes whether the regulation of the intrastate activity is an 
essential part of that overall scheme “in which the regulatory scheme 
could be undercut unless the intrastate activity were regulated.”234 A 
court must ask whether the overall scheme would fail if the regulation in 
question were not sustained. In a sense, this exposes an apparent fallacy 
in the “class of activities” theory because the inquiry examines, 
essentially, how intrastate wetlands substantially affect interstate 
commerce. Nevertheless, the specific inquiry would not be proper if the 
broader inquiry could not be satisfied. Moreover, wetland regulation 
calls for the Necessary and Proper Clause to be applied to channels of 
commerce, rather than to activities that substantially affect commerce. 
Regulation of wetlands is essential to the overall regulation of 
navigable waters. The effects of wetlands on the nation’s waters are 
numerous and extensive.235 First, and perhaps most importantly, 
wetlands act as filters that absorb and neutralize harmful chemicals and 
microorganisms in water.236 The Supreme Court and Congress have 
 230. Ashland Oil, 504 F.2d at 1325. 
 231. Baumgartner, supra note 132, at 2161. 
 232. See sources cited supra note 172. 
 233. See, e.g., SWANCC, 531 U.S. 159 (2001); United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, 
Inc., 474 U.S. 121 (1985); Ashland Oil, 504 F.2d 1317. 
 234. Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195, 2217 (2005) (Scalia, J., concurring) (quoting United 
States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 561 (1995)). 
 235. See supra note 111. 
 236. HASLAM, supra note 111, at 166–77; KUSLER & OPHEIM, supra note 111, at 5–6; LEWIS, 
supra note 111, at 49–60; Holman, supra note 24, at 205 (“The [wetlands] . . . of the American 
landscape are the primary pollution control systems of the nation’s water, and the primary 
determinants of their water quality.”); Johnson, supra note 111, at 71; Environmentalists Challenge 
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recognized the need to protect the nation’s interstate water system from 
wetlands connected to that system because “[w]ater moves in hydrologic 
cycles and it is essential that discharge of pollutants be controlled at the 
source.”237 This goes directly to the heart of the CWA’s primary 
objective “to restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological 
integrity of the Nation’s waters.”238 Furthermore, wetlands provide 
floodwater storage for times of high water and slowly release that water 
in drier times.239 Wetlands adjacent to large rivers, lakes, and oceans 
provide upland areas with a barrier against erosion.240 In addition to the 
CWA goals that wetlands serve, wetlands provide many benefits that 
could potentially fall within the goals of other federal regulatory 
schemes, such as the Endangered Species Act.241 In sum, “[t]he Clean 
Water Act could not achieve its purpose without such an expansive 
interpretation of navigability because big waters collect from small 
waters. The nature of the drainage network, rather than legal principles, 
forces the jurisdiction of the Clean Water Act to encompass 
wetlands.”242
2. Some additional concerns 
Allowing Congress to regulate wetlands simply because they fall 
within the broader scheme of interstate navigable waters regulation raises 
some questions. As Justice O’Connor pointed out, this principle could 
turn Lopez into a “drafting guide” that encourages Congress to legislate 
more broadly in order to extend the depth of its reach into intrastate 
affairs.243 In other words, if Congress had a question about the validity 
of an individual regulation, it could just write the statute more broadly to 
ensure that its desired piece of legislation would be upheld. 
Bush’s Earth Day Announcement, BushGreenwatch, Apr. 23, 2004, 
http://www.bushgreenwatch.org/mt_archives/000103.php. 
 237. Riverside Bayview Homes, 474 U.S. at 133 (quoting S. REP. NO. 92-414, at 77 (1972), as 
reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3668, 3742). 
 238. CWA § 101, 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (2000); see also SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 179 (Stevens, 
J., dissenting) (“The ‘major purpose’ of the CWA was ‘to establish a comprehensive long-range 
policy for the elimination of water pollution.’” (citation omitted)). 
 239. HASLAM, supra note 111, at 24; KUSLER & OPHEIM, supra note 111, at 5; Johnson, supra 
note 111, at 71. 
 240. KUSLER & OPHEIM, supra note 111, at 5. 
 241. HASLAM, supra note 111, at 25; KUSLER & OPHEIM, supra note 111, at 6. 
 242. LEWIS, supra note 111, at 10; see also United States v. Deaton, 332 F.3d 698 (4th Cir. 
2003). 
 243. Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195, 2223 (2005) (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
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Alternatively, wherever possible, Congress could simply attach its 
questionable legislation to larger “pre-existing schemes” in order to 
achieve justification.244 As to the first concern, one must remember that 
although an essential part of a larger scheme of regulation will be upheld, 
Congress still must justify the larger scheme as being within its power. If 
the larger scheme is unconstitutional, the individual components will not 
survive.245 If, however, the larger scheme is a legitimate exercise of 
congressional power, then it should not be objectionable to preserve 
legislation that is essential to the efficacy of that scheme. 
As to the second concern, allowing Congress to enact legislation 
because it falls within a broader scheme does not rob the courts of their 
power to strike that legislation where Congress has ingenuously alleged 
the connection. In the case of pre-existing schemes, it will be all the 
more difficult for Congress to effectively justify that its new legislation 
is “essential” to that scheme, simply by virtue of the fact that the scheme 
will have survived thus far without the proposed addition. In sum, the 
fact that the overall scheme must be legitimate and that no piece of 
legislation can ride on the coattails of that scheme without being 
“essential” to the scheme will ensure that the federal government does 
not “effectually obliterate the distinction between what is national and 
what is local and create a completely centralized government.”246
V. CONCLUSION 
The Seventh Circuit happened to get the correct outcome in Gerke 
but based the holding on inadequate rationale. A thorough examination 
of Commerce Clause jurisprudence reveals that because wetlands are an 
indispensable part of the larger scheme of regulating navigable waters, 
and because the CWA regulates a class of activities within Congress’s 
reach under its channels-of-commerce power, federal regulation of 
intrastate wetlands does not exceed the Constitution’s grant of commerce 
power. Lopez, Morrison, and Gonzales did not herald the fall of federal 
 244. Id. 
 245. For an application of this limitation, see GDF Realty Investments., Ltd. v. Norton, where 
the Fifth Circuit refused to extend this principle to the Endangered Species Act, Pub. L. 93-205, 87 
Stat. 884 (1973) (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531–1544 (2000)), as applied to a certain 
cave insect because it lacked evidence that “any take of a Cave Species is (a) part of a larger 
‘economic’ regulatory scheme [or] (b) so essential to the larger national scheme that the accidental 
crushing of one Cave Species underfoot . . . threatens to undo the national program.” 362 F.3d 286, 
290–91 (5th Cir. 2004). 
 246. NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel, 301 U.S. 1, 37 (1937). 
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environmental statutes but, rather, the honest examination of these 
statutes. Gerke is a prime example of the problem and the judicial 
attitude toward this issue. 
With the federal courts of appeal in disagreement, and owners of 
wetland property in a state of uncertainty, the issue is ripe for Supreme 
Court review.247 The judiciary holds the highest duty of care in 
interpreting our Constitution clearly and candidly. While it is certainly 
laudable for a court to reach the right result in a case, our system of law 
requires explicit and correct reasoning as well so that judges have 
guidance for their decisions and so that everyone else has guidance for 
their conduct. This is especially important in cases that define the limits 
of the power of the government, for as Hamilton stated, 
There is no position which depends on clearer principles, than that 
every act of a delegated authority, contrary to the tenor of the 
commission under which it is exercised, is void. No legislative act 
therefore contrary to the constitution can be valid. To deny this would 
be to affirm that the deputy is greater than his principal; that the servant 
is above his master; that the representatives of the people are superior 
to the people themselves; that men acting by virtue of powers may do 
not only what their powers do not authorise, but what they forbid.248
Joshua L. Lee
 247. Two such cases are set for review in the 2005–06 term: Carabell v. U.S. Army Corps of 
Eng’rs, 391 F.3d 704 (6th Cir. 2004), cert. granted, 126 S. Ct. 415 (2005); United States v. Rapanos, 
376 F.3d 629 (6th Cir. 2004), cert. granted, 126 S. Ct. 414 (2005). 
 248. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 414 (Alexander Hamilton) (J.R. Pole ed., 2005). 
